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Industries commonly go through cycles in which rms have very high valuations.
These high valuations are written about as the start of a \new era" in which pro-
ductivity increases and new products justify very high stock-prices.1 These high
valuations frequently are accompanied by very high investment when rms perceive
the returns to investment to be high relative to their cost of capital. However, there
also exists the perception that industries commonly go through periods of over invest-
ment followed by subsequent low returns to investment. These periods of very high
investment followed by low returns have been seen most recently in the telecommu-
nications industry. From 1997 to 2002, investors added $880 billion to this industry.
Subsequently over one-half of this investment has been lost according to Thomson
Financial in New York, with at least 63 telecommunications rms going bankrupt.
This phenomenon of very high investment followed by low subsequent invest-
ment is not just present in the recent internet boom. Other industries such as the
Winchester disk drive industry and the early railroad industry have similar patterns.
Sahlmon and Stevenson (1987) note that in mid-1983 the Winchester disk drive in-
dustry had a market capitalization of $5.4 billion, but by years end, the industry
value fell to $1.4 billion as net income fell by 98 percent. Extensive miles of track
were laid (including spurs to future towns not yet built) by rms in the railroad
industry only to be followed by extensive bankruptcies in the late 1870s.2
Despite the attention that these industry booms and busts receive in the press,
little is known about how industry competition aects both nancial and real indus-
try business cycles. Our paper examines the extent that real and nancial outcomes
following industry booms and busts are related to industry-level competition. These
industry business cycles are signicant and are often unaligned with market-wide
cycles, suggesting that industry characteristics matter. We test theoretical predic-
tions about whether competition, valuation uncertainty and high costs of information
gathering are important to understanding ex post outcomes. We nd strong support
for the conclusion that market participants in competitive industries rely on common
industry information and do not internalize the eects of high competition.
We nd that changes in operating performance and future abnormal stock re-
1See WSJ March 23, 2000 \Is there rational for lofty prices?" and January 19, 1999 \IPOs are
dierent in current era of net-stock mania".
2See: http://www.eslarp.uiuc.edu/ibex/archive/vignettes/rrboom.htm. The Chicago Sun
Times wrote in 1872: that wealth from the railroads \will so overow our coers with gold that
our paupers will be millionaires, and our rich men the possessors of pocket money which will put
to shame the fortunes of Croesus."
1turns are negatively related to ex ante industry-level valuation (our measure of in-
dustry booms) and new nancing in competitive growth industries but much less so
in concentrated industries. High stock-market valuations in competitive industries
are likely to be followed by subsequent downturns in cash ows and stock returns,
especially when there is substantial new nancing and investment by rms in the
industry. These relations are signicantly more negative than similar relations in
concentrated industries, and cannot be explained by standard controls including
size and value/growth proxies. Our results also persist after controlling for recent
changes in capital expenditures in the industry and after controlling for potential
mean reversion in operating cash ows.
We examine whether the predictable busts we observe were predicted by analysts
and investors, and we consider analyst forecasts of earnings per share (EPS). We
perform predictive tests of future EPS using ex-ante analyst forecasts, and nd that
analyst estimates were positively biased in competitive growth industries, especially
those with the high relative valuations. We do not nd analogous biases in concen-
trated industries nor in industries with high market risk. Our ndings are also robust
to excluding the internet boom of 1998 to 2000 form our sample.
Our results for abnormal stock returns also show large dierences in industries
with high valuations. These patterns dier based on industry competitiveness. In
competitive industries with the highest relative valuation, and also in competitive
growth industries, we nd that rm abnormal stock returns are negatively related to
industry relative valuation, high investment and industry new nance. We also nd
that predictable busts are associated with high comovement of rm returns within
competitive industries.
These ndings are economically signicant - both for operating cash ows and
stock returns. In competitive industries, a one standard deviation increase in relative
industry valuation is associated with a three percent decline in operating cash ows.
A one standard deviation increase in industry nancing is associated with a 5.5
percent decline in operating cash ows.
In competitive growth industries, annual abnormal stock returns for an industry
level portfolio in the highest quintile of relative industry valuation are over three per-
centage points lower than a portfolio in the lowest quintile. If we weight by rm rather
than by industry, this abnormal return dierence exceeds ten percentage points. In
concentrated industries, quintile returns are non-monotonic, and magnitudes are less
than half as large.
Our results are consistent with a new explanation not previously documented:
2the eect of high competition among rms on both cash ows and stock prices in
competitive industries. The predictable busts we observe in competitive industries
are consistent with a failure of investors and industry participants to internalize the
eect of competition on longer term outcomes. These eects are not correctly fore-
casted by analysts and are not anticipated in stock returns using the latest style
and factor adjustment models. In contrast, we do not nd evidence of predictable
busts in concentrated industries. Firms in concentrated industries, given their en-
hanced pricing power, are more likely to internalize the eect of their actions on
industry-wide prices, cash ows, and stock returns.3
While the eect of competition on cash ows may be natural and expected,
the predictability of stock returns following booms and busts, after adjusting for
style characteristics and Fama-French factors, is more puzzling. We thus investigate
whether our evidence is consistent with the predictions of recent rational models of
booms and busts. Pastor and Veronesi (2005) (PV) show that increases in systematic
risk can cause industry busts after booms as industry participants adopt a standard
technology. Aguerrevere (2006) and Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004) also
predict that systematic risk might increase after booms associated with the exercise
of real options. DeMarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2006a,b) predict that participants
with relative wealth concerns rationally overinvest (both in physical and nancial
assets) in industries with high systematic risk.
We nd that market betas increase and idiosyncratic risk decreases after industry
booms consistent with PV (2005). We also nd that adjusting stock returns by ex
post measured changes in risk reduces the magnitude of the return predictability we
document. However, in industries with the highest valuations, nearly all of the return
predictability persists after adjusting for these changes. Hence, change-in-risk-based
explanations cannot explain the extent of our ndings in the most highly-valued
competitive industries. Consistent with the concern for relative wealth, our results
are stronger in competitive industries with higher ex ante market risk. However,
while this eect may explain part of our results regarding high industry investment,
relative investment is less signicant than our other industry variables in predicting
future cash ows and stock returns.
We conclude that although the eect of competition on changes in cash ows may
be natural in competitive industries, current stock market theories cannot explain the
extent of the predictability of stock returns that we document. Also, these theories
3There is related research in economics that has examined theoretically whether there can be
excessive competition and entry within industries. Weizsacker (1980), Martin (1984), Mankiw and
Whinston (1986) and Scharfstein (1988) present models addressing this question. We discuss this
literature more extensively in the next section.
3cannot explain the biased analyst estimates we nd in some competitive industries.
Overall, our ndings in more extreme industries are consistent with stock market
participants not anticipating the magnitude of the eects of competition.
Related to our paper is the recent theoretical and empirical work by Rhodes-Kropf
and Viswanathan (2004) and Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005),
respectively. In these papers, misvaluation occurs at the sector and rm level in a
rational setting, and this aects merger and acquisition activity. Managers are not
able to distinguish between misvaluation and possible synergies, and merger waves
can arise. This signal extraction problem is also related to papers on rational herding
and investment cascades (early models are Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Welch
(1992)).4
What is shared by these models and our interpretation of our ndings is that
rms may make inecient decisions when they rely on information common to all
rms. Our study focuses on the impact of industrial organization given that rms
face a coordination problem in competitive industries, and may not internalize, or
have the incentives to internalize, the eect of their actions on industry prices and
returns. These issues are likely to be most extreme when information about rival
rms is costly or dicult to gather, as is likely the case in competitive industries
where larger numbers of rival rms exist.
Our results add to existing results in several new ways. First, our paper's main
focus is on industry structure, and we show that subsequent outcomes after industry
booms and busts vary dramatically across levels of industry competitiveness. Our
results show that competitive industries, but not concentrated industries, experience
signicant downturns following high industry valuation and new industry nancing.
These downturns eect both stock returns and cash ows.5 Second, we show that
the eects of industry new nancing and industry valuation on stock returns in
competitive industries are especially negative in the top tercile of ex-ante industry
valuation and the top tercile of ex-ante industry market risk. Third, we show that
changes in rm risk only partially explain predictable boom and bust patterns. These
results support key predictions of industrial organization theories, and theories of
4The idea that noisy signals can create cycles dates back to the original Lucas island economy
and the real business cycle models of Kydland and Prescott.
5Although not considering the role of industry competition, related empirical work also doc-
uments results related to ours. Beneish and Nichols (2008) also use accounting based measures
of investment, valuation, and nancing activity and relate them to stock returns at the rm level.
More specialized articles nd low stock returns following high investment (see Titman, Wei, and Xie
(2004) and Polk and Sapienza (2006) for cross-sectional results, and Lamont (2000) for time-series
results). Related to our results on industry nancing, Baker and Wurgler (2000) show that when
the share of equity issuance is in the top quartile, market-wide returns are 15 percent below the
average market-wide returns over time.
4decision making under high uncertainty, and shed new light on how industry business
cycles might form.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a dis-
cussion of industrial organization based theories of booms and busts and presents
testable implications. Section III discusses the data and our empirical measures of
rm valuation and relative valuation. Sections IV and V present and discuss the
results on how industry valuation and nancing booms impact subsequent operating
cash ows and stock returns, respectively. Section VI concludes.
II Industrial Organization and Booms and Busts
In this section we review the existing theoretical models and empirical ndings that
are related to our paper. Given that our focus is on industrial organization, we focus
rst on the potential impact of industrial organization on booms and busts. At the
end of this section we also consider the implications of risk-based theories of booms
and busts.
A Concentrated and Competitive Industries
There is a large body of work that has focused on the eects of competition in
both concentrated and competitive industries. The most famous work dates back to
Schumpeter (1942) in which he coined the term \creative destruction." Schumpeter's
work focused on the process of creative destruction in which entrants challenge the
status quo through innovation. The view Schumpeter espoused in his posthumous
book published in 1942 is that entrants with new technologies challenge rms in
concentrated industries in order to displace established market leaders. Expansion
and entry occurs in these industries as these industries are \where the money is."
Other articles suggest that competitive industries bear the greatest risk from
new competition. Schumpeter's early work in 1912 focused on creative destruction
in competitive industries. In Schumpeter's creative destruction story, there is an
innovation and the market forms high expectations (rationally or irrationally) about
the future prospects of this industry. These opportunities increase industry and
rm valuations above their long-run historical levels. Firms observing these positive
industry valuations, and positive own valuations, raise capital and invest. Firms
may suer from a signal extraction problem, as they may not know what fraction
of the positive signal they receive is attributable to opportunities they have, or
opportunities available to all rms in the industry. Individually, rms try to invest
5before competitors who receive the same investment opportunity as in Grenadier
(2002). More broadly, rms in competitive industries suer from an inability to
coordinate their investment.
Related to this idea is the extensive research on R&D and patent races (summa-
rized by Reinganum (1989)) showing there can be excessive entry. This literature
predicts that industries facing new opportunities that are also characterized by ei-
ther signicant economies of scale or patent protection can suer excessive ex ante
competition with the total investment exceeding the amount that would be socially
optimal. This key feature is similar to business stealing models, where rms ratio-
nally do not consider the eect of rival rms. In contrast to business stealing models,
however, industries can be explicitly ex ante competitive with free entry.
Related to the extent of entry into industries are formal models of how excessive
entry may occur. Work by Von Weizsacker (1980), Perry (1984), Mankiw and Whin-
ston (1986) formalize how there can be a tendency for excessive entry relative to the
social optimum as entrants rationally do not take into account previous xed costs
by rival rms. The general implication of these models is that the industries have
to have large xed costs and prices above marginal cost. Entrants enter and invest
if they can price below current industry prices. Firms enter despite large xed costs
as they can subsequently steal market share away from existing rms.
B High Information Costs and High Uncertainty
Understanding how information is produced around times of industry innovation
is central to understanding how investment decisions might vary across industries.
In this section, we discuss the theoretical motivation for how poor outcomes can
arise in competitive industries, especially if rms are unable to eciently gather
information about rivals, and if valuation uncertainty is high. We begin by discussing
non-Industrial Organization theories of valuation booms and busts, and the link to
common industry comovements in cash ows and stock returns.
Veldkamp (2006) develops a rational model in which high xed costs of producing
information on individual rms causes investors to focus on signals that are common
to many rms. How decisions are made when information is common to many rms
is also central to Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Welch (1992), and Rhodes-Kropf and
Viswanathan (2004) (RKV) regarding herding, cascades, and merger decisions. A
unifying theme is that high uncertainty can lead managers to make decisions similar
to those of prior participants.
Empirically we follow Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) and consider an economy
6in which cash ows for rm i are driven by common market wide and industry shocks
that cause rms in the same industry to have stock returns that comove as follows:
ri;j;t = Bi;0 + Bi;m  rm;t + Bi;j  rj;t + i;j;t (1)
where ri;j;t is the return of rm i in industry j at time t, rm;t is the market return,
rj;t is the return of industry j and i;j;t is a rm specic shock.
As Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) note, this expression for comovement is
based on a large literature including Roll (1988) and recently Durnev, Morck, and
Yeung (2004). The authors focus on the relationship between stock comovements and
investment eciency. It is important to note that, although stock price comovements
can be related to demand shocks as well as numerous other theoretical causes,6
virtually all theories predict that comovement mechanisms result in less information
on rm-specic fundamentals being impounded into stock prices. When comovement
is high, managers thus have little information outside of common signals, and are
likely to make similar investment decisions, especially when information is dicult
to gather from other sources.
We postulate that information about rivals and optimal investment policy is
dicult and costly to gather when large numbers of rms exist as in a competitive
industry. Thus, market participants are more likely to rely on common industry price
movements. We abstract from the overall market in equation (1) and operationalize
the link to industry concentration in the following specication (Hj;t denotes the
industry Herndahl):
ri;j;t = Bi;j  (1   Hj;t)  rj;t + i;j;t (2)
The idea expressed here is that when the industry is very competitive, Hj;t will be
close to zero and industry-level shocks will drive more of each rm's stock return,
consistent with the postulated high costs of gathering rm-specic information in
competitive industries. In this setting, optimal investment policy will be a func-
tion of known quantities including industry returns, industry competitiveness, and
information gathered from rm-specic sources including stock prices (i;j;t):
I

i;j;t = (rj;t; Hjt; i;j;t) (3)
The following linear functional form operationalizes the assumption that managers
face higher information gathering costs in competitive industries:
I

i;j;t = 1  (1   Hj;t)  rj;t + 2  Hj;t  i;j;t (4)
6Comovement can also be linked to industry herding as discussed earlier, lack of transparency as
modeled by Li and Myers (2005), contagion as in Pritsker and Kodres (2002) and Kyle and Xiong
(2001), style investing as in Barberis and Shleifer (2003), and investor sentiment as in Barberis,
Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005).
7We note that investment is a function of a rm's marginal q, as well as the rm
specic shock i;j;t, and that this information is contained in i;j;t. Substituting qi;j;t
and i;j;t for i;j;t yields:
I

i;j;t = 1  (1   Hj;t)  rj;t + 2  Hj;t  qi;j;t + 3  Hj;t  i;j;t (5)
When the cost of gathering information on large numbers of rivals is high, rms in
competitive industries will thus invest more following high industry stock returns
(rj;t). Firms in concentrated industries will rely more on rm specic information
and research (qi;j;t and i;j;t). This relationship can be amplied by the fact that rms
in highly competitive industries face a non-cooperative investment choice, wherein
an optimal response to a new investment opportunity is to invest before competitors.
Therefore more immediate investment is more likely to occur in competitive indus-
tries than in concentrated industries. This implies that the elasticity of investment
to industry price shocks in competitive industries is high.
Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) and Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) show
that such a positive association between investment and returns creates tension be-
cause investment policy is less ecient. The authors attribute this to private in-
formation being less informative when returns are more synchronous, and investors
convey less useful rm-specic information to managers through prices.
Initial positive returns following a shock might cause high investment. This in
turn might generate additional positive returns and investment until the new capacity
starts producing. The degree of resulting overinvestment can be amplied further by
managerial motives to try to capture more of the market, and also because managers
might be shielded from blame because rival managers make similar decisions.
Overinvestment following positive industry shocks can then lead to subsequent
industry busts aecting subsequent returns and cash ows at the rm and industry
level as follows:
ri;j;t+1 = Bi;0 + Bi;j  (1   Hj;t)  rj;t+1 + i;t+1 + i(I

i;j;t   Ii;j;t) + j(I

j;t   Ij;t) (6)
CFi;j;t;t+1 = i;0 + i;j(1   Hj;t)j;t+1 + i;t+1 + i(I

i;j;t   Ii;j;t) + j(I

j;t   Ij;t) (7)
These two equations motivate our examination of how ex post returns and cash
ows may depend on ex ante industry returns and investment, and why we consider
industry concentration.
Hypothesis 1: In competitive industries, especially those with high price uncer-
tainty; high valuation, high investment and high nancing will be associated with
lower ex post industry and rm protability and lower ex post stock returns. These
8predictable booms and busts should be associated with high return comovement and
optimistic analyst forecasts.
C Alternative Risk Based Theories
Following our examination of cash ows, we examine the eect of industry compe-
tition on abnormal stock returns. Recent work by Hou and Robinson (2005) empir-
ically supports the contention that there is competitive risk priced in stock market
returns. For theoretical consistency, if competitive risk is priced, assets exposed to
this competitive risk factor should be more procyclical. In our context, competitive
risk can be procyclical as follows. In boom times, opportunities arise that require
additional nancing and investment. Industry valuations then increase above their
historical values. These valuations can be leveraged when GDP growth is high, as
access to capital is likely to be highest. However, in competitive industries, rms
will aggressively exploit these opportunities and thus capital will ow more quickly
into these industries, causing competitive industries to be more pro-cyclical. Re-
turn dierences in competitive versus concentrated industries might thus load on a
systematic priced risk factor related to changes in GDP, and we test the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2A: Decreased stock returns following booms in competitive industries
result from a systematic priced risk factor related to product market competition.
Aguerrevere (2006) introduces product market competition into a real options
based model of the rm, and shows that competition can aect asset returns and
rm risk via industry demand. A key prediction is that market risk will decrease as
demand increases in competitive industries (industry booms), but will then increase
as demand declines (industry busts). Decreases in market risk during booms arise
because rms in competitive industries face a high likelihood of preemption by com-
petitors. These rms nd it optimal to exercise growth options earlier than rms
in concentrated industries. When demand decreases, market risk increases more in
competitive industries because rms in these industries optimally delay shut down
decisions because the benets of shutting down capacity accrue most to industry
rivals. This increase in market risk in competitive industries is especially strong as
these rms have higher operating leverage when demand declines.7
Hypothesis 2B: During industry booms, systematic risk decreases more for rms
in competitive industries than in concentrated industries. Following decreases in
7The operating leverage eect on stock market risk and returns in a real option context was
introduced by Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004).
9demand (industry busts), systematic risk increases more for rms in competitive
industries than in concentrated industries.
Three recent articles oer explanations regarding how boom and bust patterns
can develop rationally given eects of risk. Pastor and Veronesi (2005) and DeMarzo,
Kaniel, and Kremer (2006a,b) model how new technological opportunities can play a
role in the formation of rational boom and subsequent bust patterns. While many of
these theories are hard to separate from models of excessive competition or herding,
we do test two hypotheses about the role of risk in booms and busts.
In Pastor and Veronesi (2005), there is a rational boom and bust linked to a
switch of uncertainty (risk) from idiosyncratic to systematic. This change in the
composition of risk occurs after rms standardize on the winning technology. This
increase in systematic risk will thus cause a subsequent drop in stock prices. We thus
test the following prediction of their model:
Hypothesis 2C: Systematic risk will increase and idiosyncratic risk will decrease
following industry valuation booms.
The alternative to Hypotheses 2B and 2C is that risk changes do not explain
subsequent stock market returns given market participants fail to take into account
the eect of product market competition on cash ows.
We test a related hypothesis from Demarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2006b) and De-
marzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2006a) (henceforth DKK). DKK model how protable
and fast growing rms have low expected returns because they provide consump-
tion insurance to investors, especially when future resources are in limited supply
and when the technology is correlated with aggregate consumption.8 These relative
wealth concerns can explain why overinvestment and herding can develop in indus-
tries that are viewed as providing large fractions of future consumption. As noted
by the authors, these concerns should be most relevant when the distribution of
industry returns is highly correlated with the market. The main idea is that high
systematic risk implies comovement, and hence a more likely outcome that other
agents in the economy will become rich if the new technology is successful. We thus
test the following prediction:
Hypothesis 2D: In industries with high systematic risk, subsequent stock market
returns will be especially negatively related to high industry valuation, investment,
and nancing.
8While they focus on the dissipation of rents in competitive industries with decreasing returns
to scale, they do not model the dierences between competitive and concentrated industries.
10III Data and Methodology
A Industry Competitiveness
We classify industries by their competitiveness on the basis of three-digit SIC codes
using measures that capture both public and private rms. We discard all rms
residing in industries that are identied as \miscellaneous" by the Census Bureau,
as it is likely that rms in these groups cannot be classied (and hence they do
not compete in similar product markets).9 We also classify industries into growth
and value industries based on industry-average book to market ratios. We rst
winsorize rm book-to-market ratios at the 1/99 percentile level prior to taking
industry averages and classify growth (value) industries as industries in the lowest
(highest) tercile of industry book-to-market ratios.
We merge data obtained from Compustat and CRSP to obtain information on
rm nancials and stock prices. Following standard practice in the literature, we
exclude from our sample nancial rms (SICs 6000-6999) and regulated utilities
(SICs 4900-4999). We also restrict our sample to the years 1972 to 2004, as net
equity and debt issuing activity are not available prior to this period. In order for a
rm year to remain in our sample, at a minimum, the rm must have valid CRSP
and COMPUSTAT data both in the given year and in the previous year. Merging
the CRSP and Compustat databases, and applying these lters, yields a total of
108,522 rm year observations.
We classify industries into competitive and concentrated industries using both
public and private rms.10 We calculate a measure of industry concentration that
accounts for privately held rms by combining COMPUSTAT data with Herndahl
data from the Commerce Department and employee data from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS).11 The inclusion of BLS data is necessary to examine all industries
with greater depth, as the Department of Commerce Herndahl data only covers
manufacturing industries.
To classify industries by their competitiveness, we calculate a Herndahl{Hirschman
Index (HHI) for each industry in each year using a two-step procedure. First, for
the subsample of manufacturing industries (where we have actual HHIs including
both public and private rms for every fth year), we regress actual industry HHI
9Because they operate in nearly identical product markets, we also combine the following indus-
tries in each set of parentheses: (20, 70), (210, 211), (220-225), (254, 259), (278, 279), (322, 323),
(333, 334), (520, 521), (533, 539), (540, 541), (570, 571), and (700, 701).
10Our initial tables just used Compustat public rms to classify industries. These tables are
available from the authors and showed similar, slightly stronger ndings.
11We thank David Robinson for sharing these data with us.
11from the Commerce Department on three variables: the Compustat public-rm-only
Herndahl,12 the average number of employees per rm using the BLS data (based
on public and private rms), and the number of employees per rm for public rms
using Compustat data. We also include interaction variables of each of these rm
size variables with the HHI calculated from Compustat data.
In our second stage, we use the coecient estimates from this regression to com-
pute tted HHI for all industries. This tted method has the advantage of capturing
the inuence of both public and private rms, and can also be computed for all
industries. To mitigate measurement error, we do not use these tted HHIs in any
regression, but rather we classify industries into concentrated versus competitive ter-
ciles based on this variable. We classify industries in the highest tercile of tted HHI
as concentrated and those industries in lowest tercile as competitive.
The correlation between actual HHIs, as specied by the Department of Com-
merce for manufacturing industries, and our tted HHIs, is 54.2%. The correlation
between Compustat HHIs using segment data and the actual manufacturing HHIs
is only 34.1%.13 The less than perfect 54.2% correlation between our tted measure
and the actual HHIs suggests that the acquisition of additional data by future re-
searchers might be useful. However, we conclude that our tted HHIs oer signicant
improvements relative to the basic COMPUSTAT HHI, and also have the advantage
over manufacturing HHIs in that they cover all industries.
B Industry Valuation, Investment and Financing
In order to identify the conditions that likely surround industry booms and busts,
we construct three proxies of new industry-level opportunities and relative industry
valuation: (1) industry-wide valuation relative to historical values using a procedure
described below, (2) industry-wide investment relative to predicted investment, and
(3) industry nancing. These proxies either reect beliefs about an industry having
good future prospects (industry valuation), or they measure current actions that are
consistent with acting on new opportunities (investment and nance).
We dene an industry and rm's \relative" time-series valuation (we refer to this
12We compute Compustat HHI using the rm segment tapes in years the segment data is available
(1984 onwards) to break a multi-segment rm's sales into the industries in which it operates. We
then include two Compustat HHI variables in our regression. The rst variable equals the HHI in
years prior to 1984, and zero in years when the segment tapes are available. The second one equals
the HHI in subsequent years using the segment tapes, and zero in previous years.
13In an earlier version of this paper we conducted all of our tests results using the Herndahls
computed from Compustat and the Compustat segment tapes. The predictable cashows and stock
returns (signicant coecients) we found were similar to the ones we report in the tables.
12measure as relative valuation subsequently) using a three step procedure that is based
on the valuation model in Pastor and Veronesi (2003). From Pastor and Veronesi
(2003), we use the empirical model they speciy in equation (28) and the specication
they report in model (0) of Table II. We do not use the more extended specications
of their Table II as we do not include as variables the forward looking measures
for return on equity and stock returns. We only use lagged data in constructing
our measure of relative valuation given that we are examining ex post returns and
operating performance and do not want to have a look ahead bias in our predictions.
To construct our measure of relative valuation for each rm and industry, we use the
following three steps:
(1.) We estimate the Pastor and Veronesi (2003) valuation model using using
data from year t   10 to t   1 for all rms in inudstry j. Using the same variable
denitions they use, we regress the log of the market-to-book ratio, log(M
B ); on
minus the reciprocal of one plus rm age (AGE), a dividend dummy (DD), rm
leverage (LEV), the log of total assets (SIZE), the volatility of protability (VOLP),
and current rm return on equity (ROE) for each rm i in industry j (we suppress
the j industry subscript, as the equation is estimated separately for each industry).
Given VOLP is constant for each rm, we estimate this equation using an unbalanced




)i; = a+bAGEi; +cDDi; +dLEVi; +elog(SIZEi;)+fV OLPi; +gROEi;;
(8)
 = t   10;:::;t   1
(2.) From this estimation we use the estimated industry-specic regression coe-
cients to compute predicted values for rm market-to-book in year t. We estimate
the valuation regression above using rolling 10 year windows of lagged data in each
industry to get a set of coecients that we apply to each year t to get a measure
of predicted valuation. The tted valuation model used in the rst step assumes
that rm i's market-to-book at time t is a function of its current characteristics and
the industry specic prices of characteristics estimated from past years. Thus we
use time t characteristics and coecient estimates estimated from t 10 to t 1 to
compute predicted rm market-to-book ratios for time t.
(3) The last step is to compute relative (undpredicted) valuations , which we
henceforth call relative valuations, for each rm i at time t. A rm's total relative
valuation is its actual log(M
B ) less its predicted log(M
B ) for year t as follows:
RelativeV aluationi;t = log(
M
B




13Relative industry-level valuation is the average of all valuations over all rms
in each three-digit SIC industry. Firm-level relative valuation is the total relative
valuation minus this industry-level component.
The results we obtain later are robust to other valuation models including model
(3) from Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005), where the dependent
variable is is the log of rm market value. In addition, we also estimate a simpler
model that is analogous to a Price to Earnings (PE) model where we regress the log
of the market value on log net income and a dummy for negative net income.
These models were also estimated on 10 years of lagged data by industry and
then the coecients are used to predict current period market value using current
characteristics including net income. Our measure of relative valuation is then cal-
culated as the dierence between the log of current market value and the predicted
log market value.
Relative rm- and industry-level investment is computed using a similar method.
We regress log capital expenditures divided by lagged property plant and equipment
on standard variables from investment models, including lagged Tobin's q, variables
capturing the cash rms of rms (cash ow divided by book value of equity (ROE)
and a dividend paying dummy (DD)).14 We also include additional variables given the
existing literature. Leverage (LEV) captures the debt-overhang eect on investment
that Hennessy (2004) models. Age of the rm captures potential rm dierences in
replacement rates of capital and recovery rates if disinvestment occurs. Volatility
of cash ow (VOLP) captures the real option eect of volatility of cash ows on
investment. Tobin's q is calculated as the market value of equity plus the book value




) = a + bTOBINQi;t 1 + cROEi;t + dDDi;t + eAGEi;t+ (10)
fLEVi;t + gV OLPi;t + hlog(SIZEi;t)
From this model, we calculate relative (unpredicted) investment (which we call
relative investment) as the actual investment less the predicted investment using each
tted industry regression. Relative industry investment is the average total relative
investment in each industry. Relative rm investment is the total relative investment
minus this industry component.
We dene total \new nancing" in a given year as the sum of a rm's net equity
issuing (COMPUSTAT annual data item 108 minus item 115) and net debt issuing
14Cash ow has been shown by many papers to be related to investment. We do not take a view
on the cause of this relation.
14activity (annual data item 111 minus item 114) in a given year divided by assets.
Industry new nancing is the sum the total amount of new nancing over rms in
the industry divided by the total industry assets. Firm-specic new nancing is then
the total new nancing less the industry component.
These proxies are constructed using each industry's known ex-ante characteristics.
These proxies can be used in an unbiased fashion to predict future stock returns and
future accounting performance.
C Descriptive Industry Statistics
Table I lists the top 5 booms in competitive industries (those in the lowest tercile
based on sales HHI using three-digit SIC codes from Compustat) in each of the
following four decades: 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and in the new millennium.
[Insert Table I here]
Table I shows that in all competitive industries, Herndahl indices are below
.25. Some of the most extreme booms have over one hundred publicly traded rms
competing in the same SIC code. The business services industry had 843 public
rms. Although this last example is part of the well-known late 1990s technology
boom, the other examples suggest that high levels of valuation at the industry level
are not unique. Extreme competitive industries in the 1980s (valuations are over
100% above predicted industry valuations) deviated just as far from their long-term
valuations as those in the 1990s. More broadly, most extreme booms were not in
technology industries, as was the case in the late 1990s. For example, at least two
of the extreme 1980s boom industries were related to groceries and apparel. In the
1970s, more traditional industries including petroleum extraction and electrical work
were among the most extreme booms. Finally, because weighted relative valuations
are similar to unweighted valuations, we conclude that both large and small rms
alike are prone to industry booms and busts.
[Insert Table II here]
Table II lists the top 5 booms in concentrated industries (those in the highest
tercile based on predicted HHI), in the same four decades. The selected industries
generally have concentration levels near or exceeding 0.4. Tables I and II also show
that basic Compustat Herndahls are generally similar to our tted Herndahls. Be-
cause our tests do not use the concentration measures explicitly, but rather examine
15industries based on high and low competition categories, we thus expect and nd
similar results using either Herndahl measure.
Perhaps one dierence between concentrated and competitive industries is that
booms appear to be somewhat more extreme in concentrated industries. For exam-
ple, Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles were 298% above their predicted industry
valuations in 1995, and Musical Instruments were 220% above their predicted in-
dustry valuations in 1987. The existence of large booms in concentrated industries
indicates that ample power exists to examine whether subsequent busts occur. How-
ever, our later tables show that we do not nd evidence that concentrated industries
experiencing booms actually underperform. Hence, unlike those in competitive in-
dustries, high industry valuations in concentrated industries likely last several years.
D Firm-Level Data and Summary Statistics
We compute changes in rm-level operating cash ow (COMPUSTAT annual item
13) scaled by assets (COMPUSTAT annual item 6) in each year. We later examine
if they are related to ex ante industry and rm level relative valuation, investment
and new nance. For robustness, we also estimate our results using the change in
operating cash ow scaled by beginning period assets (year t) and nd similar results.
We compute abnormal returns using two methods advocated by recent studies.
Our main results are based on Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997).
A rm's \monthly abnormal return" is its raw return less the return of one of 125
benchmark portfolios formed on the basis of size, book to market, and past 12 month
return. Portfolios are formed at the end of each June, and (1) rm size is the
CRSP market capitalization on the formation date, (2) the book to market ratio
uses accounting data from the most recent scal year ending in the last calendar
year, and (3) past return is based on the 12 month period ending in May of the
formation year.15 Portfolio breakpoints are based only on NYSE/AMEX rms, and
we rst form quintiles in each year based on rm size. Firms in each size quintile
are then further sorted into quintiles based on industry-adjusted book to market
ratios. Each portfolio is then further sorted into quintiles based on each rm's past
12 month return. We also consider a separate method based on adjustments proposed
by Mitchell and Staord (2000) (see robustness in Section V).
Table III reports summary statistics for these cashow and return variables, and
for our key boom and bust proxies. Panel A shows that industry relative valuation
has a sample-wide mean that is near zero and a standard deviation that is large at
15This timing ensures that previous scal year accounting data is public information.
16nearly 24%. This indicates that many industries have valuations both above and
below predicted levels. Our New Financing variables are slightly positive, as more
rms raise new capital relative to those who are paying down debt and repurchasing
shares. The table also shows that all three rm level variables have higher standard
deviations than their industry counterparts. Hence, rms can deviate far from in-
dustry valuations, as one standard deviation is a full 47% of the value of an industry.
[Insert Table III here]
Panels B and C display descriptive statistics for competitive and concentrated
industries, respectively. For virtually all variables, mean levels remain close to zero.
Comparing the two panels also reveals that most variables have similar distributions
in competitive and concentrated industries. For example, both groups have industry
relative valuation standard deviations of 19.9%. We conclude that industry booms
appear to be quite similar in both groups from an ex ante perspective, and so it is
unlikely that our comparative tests are biased toward any nding. Hence, our broad
ndings regarding ex post busts only being predictable in competitive industries
(documented later) are perhaps especially surprising.
The average returns in Panels B and C also conrm the results of Hou and
Robinson (2005). The annual equivalent of the dierence in monthly returns across
the two panels suggests that concentrated industries underperform competitive ones
by about 2.4% per year. We nd a weak but opposite dierence in accounting
performance across these two groups, a result that is also consistent with Hou and
Robinson (2005)'s ndings.
IV Operating Cash Flows and Analyst Forecasts
We now examine the eect of industry booms on subsequent rm-level operating
performance and the accuracy of analyst forecasts.
A Ex Post Cash Flows
Table IV displays the results of rm-level regressions of the change in operating
cash ow on relative valuation, relative investment, and new nancing. For each
independent variable, we separately examine industry and rm specic components
as discussed earlier.16 We focus on the industry variables to directly study the
16All three rm-level variables are less than ten percent correlated with their corresponding in-
dustry components, so including both classes does not induce multicollinearity. This low correlation
17main topic of our paper: industry booms and busts, and their link to industrial
organization. The rm-specic components provide a natural test of our relative
valuation and investment variables, and permit us to both control for results found in
existing studies and to examine whether rms that deviate from explained valuations
experience even worse outcomes holding industry relative valuations xed.
Throughout our analysis, we also control for investment spikes (lagged one period
investment change) and mean reversion (lagged change in rm cash ows). These
controls account for the possibility that margins in an industry may decrease as
customers wait for a new innovation to hit the market. Investment would be high
in such a case as the industry might be in the process of replacing itself before
introducing the new product or innovation.17 Although not reported, our main
results do not change if we remove these controls.
We estimate the regressions using an unbalanced panel, and we correct standard
errors for correlation within years and within industries (three digit SIC), and for
heteroskedasticity. We do not present results for the xed eects specication at
the rm level as Moulton (1986) has shown that this method is inappropriate and
produces negatively biased standard errors when you have additional variables at the
industry level. We also do not estimate Fama-MacBeth regressions when examining
operating cash ow, as our tests document the existence of rm-level eects. Petersen
(2005) has recently shown that Fama-MacBeth regressions are biased when there is a
signicant rm-level eect (which we nd in this case, as is common when examining
accounting data).
[Insert Table IV here]
Panel A of Table IV includes the entire sample and shows that industry-level
variables matter. Industry investment and industry new nance are most negative
for the one year horizon. Relative industry valuation, in contrast, is most negative
for the two year horizon.
Panels B and C display results for the most competitive and concentrated tercile
industries, respectively. Terciles are formed based on the tted Herndahl discussed
earlier. A key result is that industry relative valuation is far more important in
competitive industries, both statistically and economically, than in concentrated in-
dustries. Although industry relative valuation does not signicantly predict one
year cash ow changes, it predicts two year changes at better than the 1% level in
is expected by construction.
17We thank Matt Rhodes-Kropf for these suggestions.
18competitive industries, and the coecient in concentrated industries is nearly zero.
The table also shows that a formal test of dierences in means indicates that the
competitive industries coecient is also signicantly dierent from the concentrated
industries coecient at the 1% level.
Panels B and C also show that the negative one year industry investment coe-
cient in Panel A is also driven by competitive industries. This coecient is roughly
ve times as large as the analogous coecient for concentrated industries. Overall,
the results support Hypothesis 1, and suggest that cash ows are negatively related
to proxies for industry booms in competitive industries, but not in concentrated in-
dustries. The analysis of both one and two year cash ow changes also suggests that
industry booms in competitive industries generally experience increases in valuation
prior to increases in investment activity. This more rened result is consistent with
Hypothesis 1. In particular, the theory outlined in Section II.B suggests that ag-
gressive investment decisions might follow positive price signals such as high ex ante
industry returns.
Panel D shows that relative industry valuation, relative industry investment, and
new industry nancing are also highly important in industries with declining con-
centration. These results support the proposition that high competition might be
a primary driver of extreme industry busts, as theories of industrial organization
suggest that declining concentration is one way to measure increasing competitive-
ness. These results are consistent with multiple rms in the same industry making
investment decisions based on common public signals.
[Insert Table V here]
Table V repeats the tests of Table IV for the subsample of rms residing in the
high growth tercile (those in the lowest tercile based on yearly sorts of industry book
to market ratios). The motivation for this test is that growth industries likely have
higher price uncertainty, and hence the predictions of Hypothesis 1 are likely to be
stronger in this subsample. As before, Panel A shows that high industry valuation is
negatively related to ex post cash ows, especially for the two year horizon. Relative
investment and nance are most negatively related to ex post cash ows for the one
year horizon.
As before, Panels B to D show that these results are driven by rms in competitive
industries and by rms in industries with declining concentration. However, the
coecient magnitudes are larger for high growth industries (Table V) than for the set
of all industries (Table IV). For example, both the one and two year relative industry
19valuation coecients are negative and signicant in Panel B, and this coecient is at
least twice as large as the coecient in Table IV. These results conrm the prediction
that predictable busts are both limited to competitive industries, and are larger in
growth industries where price uncertainty is expected to be high.
The relative industry investment coecient also increases in size in the high
growth subsample, and the industry new nance coecient also increases in Panel
D (this variable is not signicant in Panel B in either table). It is especially note-
worthy that these coecients increase in magnitude and in signicance despite the
smaller sample size in Table V, and that none of these variables are signicant for
concentrated industries in Panel C. These results strongly support Hypothesis 1 and
more broadly conrm that price uncertainty plays an important role.
These results are also robust across specications (not reported) including mod-
els with random rm eects, and to excluding the technology boom of 1998-2000
(reported in an earlier version).18 In a previous version of the paper, we also present
results using the alternative models in Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan
(2005) and a simpler \PE" model. The results are similar to the results discussed
above.
Although we do nd that the mean reversion variable (change in EBITDA) sug-
gests that cash ows do mean revert over longer horizons, and that recent investment
spikes (change in CAPX) induce some shorter-term reversion, our key ndings re-
garding relative valuation, investment, and new nance obtain regardless of whether
these controls are included.
B Analyst Forecasts
In this section, we examine whether analysts accurately predict cash ow realizations
conditioning on our measures of industry valuation, nancing, and investment. This
test helps us to address whether analysts forecast the cash ow declines we observe,
and in particular, whether they forecast the eect of increased competition on ex-post
outcomes. Under Hypothesis 1, we would expect that industry relative valuations
would be associated with positively biased analyst forecasts given H1, but only in
competitive industries when valuation uncertainty is high.
We use the methods outlined in Hong and Kubik (2003) to examine analyst
forecast optimism. We use I/B/E/S analyst forecast data from 1983 to 2005, and we
18This result suggests that the technology boom was indeed an important example of a recent
boom and bust, but also that the sequence of events surrounding the technology boom are not new,
as other industries have befell similar fates throughout our sample period.
20use the I/B/E/S summary database as we are only interested in examining whether
analysts are biased in aggregate. To generate our measure of forecast optimism, we
rst dene Fi;t as the consensus mean forecast of earnings per share one year before
rm i's scal year end in year t, and Ai;t as the actual earnings per share ultimately
realized at year t's scal year end. Pi;t denotes the share price at the time the forecast





In Table VI, we explore whether ex-post analyst forecast optimism is related to
our ex-ante measures of industry booms. We present results for competitive and
concentrated industries, as well as subsamples limited to rms that also reside in
industries in the high growth tercile. All terciles are formed by sorting industries in
each year on the basis of the given characteristic.
[Insert Table VI here]
Table VI shows that forecasts are biased upward in the competitive high growth
tercile, but not in the concentrated high growth tercile. We nd no evidence of an
analyst bias in the broader sample of competitive or concentrated industries.
We conclude that analysts likely anticipate the eects of industry valuation on
future earnings accurately on average in broader samples, but do not anticipate the
more extreme cash ow declines observed in high growth industries. These results
suggest that, like managers, analysts face similarly high information gathering costs
in competitive industries, and are more likely to make predictions based on aggregate
price signals, especially valuation uncertainty is high. The ndings in the high growth
competitive subsample are consistent with Hypothesis 1.
These ndings suggest that some of the predictable busts we observe in broader
industry subsamples might be consistent with alternative theories including ratio-
nal risk-based theories. We explore this conjecture more in later sections and nd
support. However, the results in more extreme subsamples (eg those in high growth
industries) are more consistent with Hypothesis 1.
V Stock Returns and Industry Factors
A Industry Competition and Stock Returns
We now consider the eect of competition on outcomes in the stock market. Table VII
displays the results of rm-level regressions of monthly abnormal returns on relative
21valuation, relative investment, and new nancing. As before, for each independent
variable, we separately examine its industry average and its rm-specic deviation
from its industry average.
[Insert Table VII here]
Panel A of Table VII shows that industry relative valuation, relative investment
and new nancing are negatively related to future stock returns. The relative in-
dustry valuation coecient is especially negative in the more extreme subsamples
including high growth industries, high valuation industries, and high market risk
industries. This suggests that booms and predictable busts are larger for these more
extreme industries, consistent with valuation uncertainty being higher in these in-
dustries. The relative industry investment and industry nance variables are more
uniformly negative across subsamples.
The highly signicant and negative coecients on the rm-level variables arms
the ndings of existing studies, and the role of our proxies as valid measures of rm
value, and suggest that rms have a strong tendency to revert back to the valuation
suggested by their industry characteristics. Unique to our study is the inclusion
of the industry-level variables, and our nding that they are especially relevant in
competitive industries.
Given our strong industry results, it is natural to ask about the role of indus-
trial organization. Panels B and C display results for the most competitive and
most concentrated tercile industries, respectively. As in earlier sections, we use the
\tted concentration measure," which predicts an industry's concentration from a
combination of public and private industry data.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that that abnormal stock returns will be negative in com-
petitive industries following periods of high valuation and investment. In the broad
sample (rst column), we nd that industry new nance is more important in Panel
B for competitive industries than in concentrated industries in Panel C, consistent
with Hypothesis 1. This coecient is negative and signicant at the 1% level in Panel
B, and is not signicant in Panel C. The dierence in coecients is also signicant
in two of three specications. These results are also economically meaningful. For
example, the industry new nance coecients are roughly two to three times larger
for some specications in Panel B than in Panel C. The relative industry valuation
and relative industry investment variables are not signicantly dierent in this broad
sample (rst column).
22Because Hypothesis 1 predicts that these variables should matter more when
price uncertainty is high, we next examine the extreme subsamples in the last three
columns. In all three extreme subsamples, we continue to nd that industry new
nance matters, but we also now nd that relative industry valuation is signicantly
dierent across competitive (Panel B) and concentrated industries (Panel C). The
sign of this variable even reverses in some concentrated industry subsamples, and it
remains consistently negative and signicant in competitive industries. We conclude
that our proxies for industry booms play a considerably stronger role in predicting
industry busts in competitive industries as is predicted by Hypothesis 1, and that
this result is most noteworthy in extreme industries where it is likely that valuation
uncertainty is high .
Panel D shows that industry new nancing and relative investment are also im-
portant for industries with declining concentration and in particular, in the extreme
industry groupings with declining concentration. These ndings further support Hy-
pothesis 1, as theories of industrial organization suggest that declining concentration
is one way to measure increasing competitiveness.
The signicance of both rm-level and industry-level variables suggests that, as
in the case of operating cash ows, the most extreme rms also have more negative
outcomes. Inferences from the RRV models (not reported to conserve space) are
essentially identical to those presented.
Demarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2006b) (DKK) (Hypothesis 2D) present a the-
ory of investment and relative wealth concerns, and suggest that predictable bust
patterns should be largest in high systematic risk industries. The high market risk
tercile in the last column of Table VII tests this prediction . In Panel B, we nd that
the industry relative investment variable in the high market risk tercile is indeed
more negative and signicant than in other subsamples, providing some support for
Hypothesis 2D. However, this result is rather weak, as a test of signicance of the
dierence in the coecients between Panel B and C reveals that this coecient is
not signicantly dierent. Moreover, we do not nd a signicant result in the high
market risk tercile for declining concentration industries in Panel D.
B Return Comovement
In this section we test the key prediction of Hypothesis 1 that return comovement will
be higher in competitive industries, especially when price uncertainty and valuations
are high (Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007), Roll (1988), and Durnev, Morck, and
Yeung (2004)). In particular, the same variables associated with predictable busts
23in competitive industries should also be associated with greater return comovement
with aggregate prices such as industry and market wide returns.
In Table VIII, the dependent variable is the R-squared of a regression of each
rm's daily stock returns in the given year on the value weighted market index
and the rm's value weighted three-digit SIC industry excluding the rm itself. We
report regression coecients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for panel data regression
models where t-statistics are adjusted for clustering over time and industry, and
corrected for heteroskedasticity. One observation is one rm in one year. We examine
this regression for competitive and concentrated subsamples, and for subsamples that
further limit rms to those in the highest growth or highest valuation tercile.
[Insert Table VIII: Return Comovement in Competitive Industries]
The rst column in Table VIII strongly supports the conclusion that rm re-
turns comove more with aggregate prices in competitive industries when industry
valuations are higher. In particular, the coecient on relative industry valuation is
signicantly positive in competitive industries, and also signicantly dierent from
the coecient in concentrated industries, both at the one percent level. The fourth
column shows that this relationship is entirely absent in concentrated industries. A
comparison of column one to columns two and three also illustrate that this result
is larger in high relative valuation industries, as the high relative valuation coe-
cient increases from .08 in column one to nearly 0.20 for the high value competitive
industry subsample in column three. These ndings strongly support Hypothesis
1. The absence of this nding in concentrated industries is consistent with rms in
concentrated industries facing lower information gathering costs due to the smaller
number of rival rms, and hence returns rely less on aggregate price changes.
Although the results for high industry valuation are strong, we nd little if any
link between return comovement and relative industry investment and new nancing
in either competitive or concentrated industries. These results are consistent with
high valuations being key to the predictable busts predicted by Hypothesis 1.
C Changes in Systematic and Idiosyncratic Risk
Pastor and Veronesi (2005) posit that high valuations and subsequent busts are,
in part, due to levels of systematic risk that can increase over time. Our ndings
regarding stock returns in the high market risk tercile in Table VII are consistent
with this prediction, but this evidence is indirect. The theory further suggests that as
technologies are adopted, systematic risk can rise, resulting in a negative return event
24(a bust) that is associated with stocks being penalized for their rise in systematic risk
(Hypotheses 2B, 2C). We now test the more specic prediction that observed industry
busts are characterized by increased systematic risk and decreased idiosyncratic risk.
We rst dene a rm year as beginning on July rst of year y, and ending on
June 30th of year t+1. Where d denotes one trading day in year y, we then regress
the daily stock returns associated with rm i in year y on the three Fama-French
factors plus momentum as follows (one regression per rm-year):
ri;y;d = i;y + i;y;1MKTd + i;y;2HMLd + i;y;3SMBd + i;y;4UMDd + i;y;d (12)
We dene a rm year's idiosyncratic risk as the standard deviation of the residuals
from this regression. We then focus on the specic theoretical predictions regard-
ing the market beta (i;y;1) and idiosyncratic risk noted above by regressing annual
changes in risk on our industry and rm measures of relative valuation, investment
and nancing.
To conserve space, and because our goal is to explain the predictable industry
returns on Table VII, we only present results for competitive industries (we only nd
predictable industry returns for this subsample). For independent variables collected
using data from calendar year t, the ex-ante risk level is measured from July of year
t to June of year t+1, and the ex-post risk level is measured from July of year t+1
to June of year t+2.
This method permits us to understand the impact that future changes in risk
have on simultaneously measured stock returns, as the theories we examine pre-
dict that risk will change ex-post while busts are in progress. We also include a
lagged risk exposure term in each regression to control for the mean reverting na-
ture of risk exposures. We also include year xed eects to maintain our focus on
cross sectional risk changes. The inclusion of year xed eects also controls for the
well-known increasing time trend associated with economy-wide risk (see Campbell,
Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001)).
[Insert Table IX: Changes in Risk in Competitive Industries]
Table IX displays the results for market risk (Panel A) and idiosyncratic risk
(Panel B) in competitive industries. The results in Panel A suggest that market risk
increases when relative valuations are high in competitive industries. This nding is
true both in the broad competitive sample (column 1) and in the extreme competitive
subsamples (columns 2 to 4). However, these results support not only Hypothesis
2C, but also Hypothesis 1 which predicts that rms in competitive industries will
25experience higher comovement with aggregate price signals (ie, they will have higher
market and industry betas). These ndings in Panel A are also consistent with
Hypothesis 2B and the real options model of Aguerrevere (2006).
Panel B helps to clarify the ambiguity associated with the results in Panel A.
The results in Panel B support the Pastor and Veronesi (2005) predictions in the
broad sample, and in the high systematic risk subsample, as idiosyncratic risk falls
while market risk increases. However, high industry valuation is not related to ex
post changes in idiosyncratic risk in the high valuation subsample. We thus conclude
that our results support Hypothesis 2C for broad industry groupings and for high
systematic risk industries, but not for high valuation industries where valuation
uncertainty is likely to be high. Results in these latter industries are most consistent
with Hypothesis 1, and hence consistent with our paper's broader ndings for these
extreme industries.
We do not nd support for Hypothesis 2C for either the high industry investment
or the new industry nance coecients. In particular, neither variable exhibits pos-
itive association with ex post market risk along with negative association with ex
post idiosyncratic risk.
Because a key focus of our study is industrial organization, we also examine
whether an additional risk factor based on industry competition, as suggested by Hou
and Robinson (2005) (Hypothesis 2A), can explain our results. We construct such
a factor by rst sorting industries into terciles based on their ex-ante concentration
levels (based on sales Herndahl indices as discussed earlier). This new factor is
then dened as the equal weighted return of rms in the highest concentration tercile
industries minus the equal weighted return of rms in the lowest concentration tercile
industries. After including a control for this competitive risk factor, we nd that
our results are materially unchanged. We also test whether including concentration
as an additional independent variable in our return predictability regressions (i.e.
concentration might be more accurately measured as a characteristic) can explain
our results. Once again, our results are materially unchanged, and we conclude
that this form of competitive risk cannot explain our ndings. Because our paper
conditions on concentration along with valuation and nancing activity, and Hou
and Robinson (2005) condition on industry concentration alone, these ndings are
not inconsistent. Rather, we conclude that our ndings are distinct.
The evidence presented in this section suggests that risk based explanations, es-
pecially theory presented by Pastor and Veronesi (2005) and Aguerrevere (2006), can
explain part of the link between high industry valuations and subsequent return re-
versals in competitive industries. However , these theories are not able to explain our
26ndings in extreme industry groups where price uncertainty and relative valuations
are high.
Also, we conclude that some results remain unexplained. For example, because
industry new nancing is associated with a modest rise in systematic risk and a
sharper rise in idiosyncratic risk, it appears less likely that current risk based expla-
nations can explain the patterns observed. Possible explanations for our industry
nancing results include some broader theories including herding based explanations
and behavioral explanations including market timing. Theoretical work has not yet
examined the role that industrial organization might play in these alternative set-
tings. What is clear throughout our ndings is that large dierences in changes in
cash ow, risk, and returns exist based on product market competition.
D Can Ex Post Changes in Risk Explain Our Results?
In this section, we examine if ex post risk changes might explain or reduce the ability
of relative industry valuation, investment, and high nancing to predict ex post stock
returns in competitive industries.19 The idea we are examining is whether market
participants anticipate future risk changes. Ex post risk changes might be important
if market participants are reacting to anticipated risk changes rather than unexpected
contemporaneous risk changes consistent with Hypothesis 2C.
We test this hypothesis using a two-stage approach. First, for a return observation
in year t+1 (given that our right-hand-side variables are indexed as year t), we regress
our monthly rm-level style matched abnormal returns on changes in the four risk
factors (MKT, HML, SMB, UMD) and idiosyncratic risk from year t to year t+2. We
also include controls for the year t risk levels given that our previous section's results
show that risk exposures are mean reverting. These regressions are non-predictive,
as we examine changes in risk across the same period in which returns are measured.
Second, we take the residuals of this rst stage regression and regress them on our
usual set of relative valuation, relative investment, and relative nancing variables.
Table X displays the results for the entire sample (Panel A) and for competitive
industries (Panel B), and for subsamples based on high growth, high relative valua-
tion, and high market risk, within each panel. The coecients in each specication
can be compared to analogous models based on standard abnormal returns in Panel
A and Panel B in Table VII. We omit concentrated industries to conserve space, and
because there is no return predictability to explain in Table VII for this subsample.
Pastor and Veronesi (2005) (Hypothesis 2C) predict that changes in risk will explain
19We thank Lubos Pastor for this suggestion.
27all or part of the return predictability we reported in these earlier tables, while Hy-
pothesis 1 and other alternatives including Demarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2006b)
(Hypothesis 2D) predict that changes in risk will explain little of this return pre-
dictability. Hypothesis 2D predicts that underperformance will be driven by relative
wealth concerns, not changes in risk attributes.
[ Insert Table X here ]
Comparing the coecients and signicance levels in Table X with those in Table
VII yields some support for the Pastor and Veronesi (2005) prediction that changes
in risk can explain some of the return predictability we nd. In Panel A (the entire
sample), for example, we nd that changes in risk greatly reduce the explanatory
power of the industry relative valuation variable. However, in Panel B (competitive
industries), changes in risk are far less inuential. For example, the high relative
industry valuation coecient barely declines from 0.029 to just 0.027 in the high
valuation subsample in Panel B. In the broad sample (Panel A), this coecient's
reduction is much more substantial from 0.015 to 0.006.
It is also noteworthy that changes in risk do have some impact in the high system-
atic risk subsample in Panel B. Here, the high relative industry valuation coecient
reduces from 0.018 to 0.010. Hence, our ndings support Hypothesis 1 in compet-
itive industries where valuation uncertainty is high, and support Hypothesis 2C in
broader industry groupings, especially in samples where systematic risk (ex ante
market beta) is high.
Table X also shows that accounting for changes in risk does not explain the re-
turn predictability of other variables including industry relative investment. Because
Demarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2006b) (DKK) attribute lower returns in industries
with high investment to relative wealth concerns, we expect that changes in risk will
not be able to explain returns if DKK's predictions hold. Our ndings regarding the
relative industry investment variable thus are consistent with both Hypothesis 2D
and Hypothesis 1, which is also generally silent regarding whether or not changes in
ex post risk will explain stock returns cross sectionally. Regarding the industry new
nance term, we also continue to see unchanged strong negative coecients when we
adjust returns for changes in risk.
E Economic Magnitude of Stock Market Returns
We examine the economic magnitude of both rm and industry-level stock returns
in the year following our ex-ante measures of relative industry valuation, investment,
28and nancing.
[Insert Table XI here]
In Table XI, we calculate both rm- and industry-level abnormal returns for quin-
tile portfolios based on ex-ante relative industry valuation, industry investment, and
industry new nancing. At the industry level, abnormal returns are equal weighted
averages of rm abnormal returns in the given month over all rms residing in the
given three digit SIC code. A rm's abnormal return is its raw monthly return minus
the monthly return of a portfolio matched on the basis of NYSE/AMEX breakpoints
of size, industry-adjusted book to market, and past year returns as in Daniel, Grin-
blatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997).
Table XI shows that the magnitude of stock price underperformance in com-
petitive industries with high relative industry valuation is economically relevant,
especially within the high growth subsample where price uncertainty is high. For
example, at the industry level in Panel C, the highest quintile of relative industry
valuation underperforms the lowest quintile by over 3.3% percentage points annu-
ally. We nd similar ndings for industry relative investment and industry relative
nance. The highest quintile of high industry relative investment and nancing shows
signicant underperformance in portfolio abnormal returns.
Table XI shows that these results are even stronger at the rm level - analogous
to weighting one observation as one rm. The highest quintile of relative industry
valuation has abnormal performance that is roughly 4.2 percentage points (per year)
lower than the lowest quintile in Panel B, and 15 percentage points lower in Panel
C. More modest, but still large, magnitudes obtain for new industry nancing and
investment. Although we do not report results for concentrated industries to conserve
space, we do not nd economically meaningful return dierences across quintiles in
concentrated industries, especially for industry level variables.
F Additional Robustness Tests
We examine robustness to using abnormal returns based on an adjustment proposed
by Mitchell and Staord (2000) (MS). We rst dene a rm year as July to June.
We then regress each rm year's twelve monthly stock returns on four factors: the
three Fama-French factors plus momentum.20 From these time series regressions, we
extract a database of yearly rm-specic intercepts describing each rm's abnormal
20We thank Ken French for providing these factors on his website.
29return in the given year. We dene a rm's \Mitchell/Staord alpha" as its yearly
intercept minus the average yearly intercept of rms residing in the given rm's
benchmark portfolio based on size, book to market, and past 12 month returns
(based on 125 portfolios as described earlier). This two-stage method ensures that
returns are suciently adjusted for known risk factors even when the relationship
between factor loadings and returns is non-linear. These tests reveal that our main
results are robust.
To further ensure robustness, we also repeat our tests using three regression meth-
ods: (1) OLS with year xed eects and industry clustering adjustments, (2) OLS
with year xed eects and both industry and year clustering adjustments, and (3) the
Fama-MacBeth method. Our inferences do not depend on the chosen specication.
VI Conclusions
Our paper examines real and nancial outcomes of industry booms and busts and
whether these outcomes are related to industry-level characteristics. We document
signicant industry booms and subsequent busts in the economy. Our results show
how real and nancial components impact industry business cycles. We nd that
in competitive industries, increases in industry valuations above predicted levels are
followed by signicantly lower operating cash ows and stock returns. Firms in
competitive industries, and in particular in competitive growth industries, have es-
pecially negative cash ows and negative abnormal stock returns following episodes
of high industry nancing and high relative industry valuation. We also nd that
analyst forecasts of future earnings per share are biased upwards in these indus-
tries. In contrast, in concentrated industries these relations are weak and generally
insignicant.
These ndings are economically signicant, both for operating cash ows and
stock returns. In competitive industries, a one standard deviation increase in indus-
try nancing is associated with a 5.5 percent ex-post decline in operating cash ows.
In the stock market, style and risk-adjusted abnormal stock returns for a competi-
tive high growth industry portfolio in the highest quintile of ex-ante relative industry
valuation are over three percentage points lower than a similar portfolio in the low-
est quintile using industry weighted returns. Using rm weighted returns, abnormal
stock returns in competitive industries are more than ten percentage points lower in
the high industry valuation quintile than in a similar portfolio in the lowest quintile.
Additional adjustments for contemporaneous changes in risk do explain some
30of our ndings, as predicted by recent theories of booms and busts. However, in
industries with the highest valuations, nearly all of the return predictability persists
after adjusting for these changes. Hence, change-in-risk-based explanations cannot
explain the extent of our ndings in the most highly-valued competitive industries.
Our results are most consistent with managers, analysts, and investors relying on
common industry signals in competitive industries. The resulting lack of coordina-
tion and the externality of high investment and nancing on all rms generates poor
ex post outcomes in these competitive industries. This eect is likely to be greatest if
industry participants fail to consider, or do not have incentives to consider, the eect
of competition when making investment and nancing decisions. In contrast, in con-
centrated industries these relations are weak and generally insignicant, consistent
with market participants internalizing the eects of competition on industry-wide
prices, cash ows, and stock returns.
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33Table I: Examples of Industry Booms in Competitive Industries
Three Weighted Average Weighted CSTAT Con- Fitted Con-
Digit Decade/ Market to Firm Relative Relative centration centration
SIC Code Industry Name Year Book Mkt Value Valuation Valuation (Herndahl) (Herndahl)
Competitive Industries
1970s
131 Oil and Gas Extraction 1979 2.72 362.0 71.0% 72.7% 0.13 0.18
233 Woman's Apparel 1976 1.18 51.4 58.5% 76.5% 0.05 0.18
173 Electrical Work 1978 1.61 110.1 53.4% 102.1% 0.15 0.19
287 Fertilizers and Agriculture Chemicals 1979 2.97 244.1 104.6% 114.5% 0.16 0.19
571 Home Furnishing Stores 1975 1.01 31.6 242.7% 126.0% 0.16 0.18
1980s
514 Groceries - Wholesale 1983 1.09 196.5 109.4% 128.3% 0.08 0.18
385 Ophthalmic Goods 1984 4.79 125.7 155.6% 131.3% 0.20 0.24
233 Woman's Apparel 1985 1.85 165.1 114.0% 132.0% 0.10 0.20
731 Advertising 1982 1.73 124.8 144.7% 135.5% 0.15 0.20
483 Radio and Television Broadcasting 1985 5.23 321.7 174.3% 185.0% 0.13 0.22
1990s
367 Semi-Conductors + Elec. Comp. 1999 11.00 5,079.7 88.8% 64.6% 0.04 0.18
737 Business Services 1999 18.77 2,502.3 100.2% 82.0% 0.04 0.13
872 Accounting + Bookkeeping Svs. 1998 10.63 325.8 138.2% 115.7% 0.17 0.22
571 Home Furnishing Stores 1993 6.68 636.5 141.2% 124.6% 0.09 0.16
233 Woman's Apparel 1990 2.26 1,862.9 136.8% 136.8% 0.07 0.16
422 Public Warehousing And Storage 1996 4.40 323.6 190.0% 176.4% 0.18 0.20
513 Apparel - Wholesale 1992 19.17 22.0 212.6% 193.3% 0.23 0.21
2000s
596 Catalog and Mail Order Houses 2004 5.40 344.5 97.6% 85.0% 0.08 0.16
122 Coal Mining 2003 4.68 1,442.0 76.5% 89.7% 0.09 0.23
835 Child Day Care Services 2004 6.36 765.6 101.5% 100.8% 0.18 0.18
153 Operative Builders 2003 1.70 1,491.4 96.8% 120.5% 0.08 0.14
783 Motion Picture Theaters 2005 26.45 1,423.6 188.4% 150.8% 0.49 0.21
245 Prefabricated Buildings 2004 1.49 296.5 140.4% 174.2% 0.18 0.20
Explanation: This table lists the top ve industries with the highest relative valuation (valuation less predicted valuation) in each decade for competitive industries. Competitive
industries are those in the lowest tercile of the tted sales based HHI (Herndahl index) in each year. We present each three digit SIC industry's identifying information and the year
in which it's relative valuation peaked. Weighted market to book equity is the industry's value weighted average of rm market-to-book ratios. Average rm market values are
reported in millions. To compute relative valuation, we rst t the following model based on Pastor and Veronesi (2003) (i denotes a rm and t denotes a year):
log( M
B )i;t = a + bAGEi;t + cDDi;t + dLEVi;t + elog(SIZEi;t) + fV OLPi;t + gROEi;t
We t this model once for each industry in each year using rm observations from year t   10 to t   1. A rm's relative valuation is its log(M=B) in year t less the tted value using
characteristics from year t and the above model estimated using the previous ten years. CSTAT concentration is the sales weighted Herndahl index for each industry (based on
segment data when available) using COMPUSTAT data only. The tted concentration index is based on three digit SIC codes and is the inferred level of industry concentration from
three databases: Department of Commerce manufacturing HHI data, Bureau of Labor Statistics employee data, and Compustat sales data. We make one deviation from selecting the
top ve industries in each decade: we add three industries (two in the 1990s and one in 2000s) from the top ten that have a very large number of rms (we list them due to their
importance).
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4Table II: Examples of Industry Booms in Concentrated Industries
Three Weighted Average Weighted CSTAT Con- Fitted Con-
Digit Decade/ Market to Firm Relative Relative centration centration
SIC Code Industry Name Year Book Mkt Value Valuation Valuation (Herndahl) (Herndahl)
Concentrated Industries
1970s
517 Petroleum Stations and Terminals 1979 1.14 1,252.5 40.2% 45.2% 0.62 0.49
422 Public Warehousing And Storage 1979 1.20 201.4 115.1% 98.8% 0.94 0.32
321 Flat Glass 1978 1.16 145.9 99.7% 105.1% 0.60 0.38
516 Chemicals + Allied Products 1979 1.26 390.9 102.6% 147.7% 0.76 0.36
387 Watches, Clocks, and Clockwork 1975 0.27 3.2 185.2% 185.2% 0.52 0.29
1980s
458 Airport Terminals 1982 3.69 21.3 152.1% 138.2% 0.74 0.28
211 Tobacco Manufactures 1986 2.57 2,095.5 144.1% 144.1% 0.27 0.68
736 Personnel Supply Services 1986 6.88 107.4 170.5% 179.0% 0.17 0.39
732 Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies 1985 5.63 73.5 160.6% 191.4% 0.43 0.44
393 Musical Instruments 1987 1.28 76.3 220.8% 220.8% 1.00 0.65
1990s
301 Tires And Inner Tubes 1992 3.93 3,794.6 121.3% 119.6% 0.68 0.90
102 Copper Ores 1995 6.83 6,274.7 131.4% 124.4% 0.18 0.38
502 Furniture And Home Furnishings 1993 16.17 33.2 165.0% 140.4% 0.46 0.33
387 Watches, Clocks, and Clockwork 1993 6.88 12.2 237.1% 237.1% 0.49 0.50
376 Guided Missiles And Space Vehicles 1995 2.93 10,252.5 188.0% 298.3% 0.27 0.56
2000s
301 Tires And Inner Tubes 2004 16.12 2,932.7 109.7% 100.3% 0.48 0.88
422 Public Warehousing And Storage 2002 2.74 4,539.6 125.3% 125.3% 0.72 0.50
784 Video Tape Rental 2005 4.94 1,177.5 115.9% 132.4% 0.55 0.55
376 Guided Missiles And Space Vehicles 2001 3.17 9,479.3 153.1% 165.5% 0.61 0.79
332 Iron and Steel Fasteners 2004 2.86 2,971.1 150.0% 175.4% 0.31 0.36
Explanation: This table lists the top ve industries with the highest relative valuation (valuation less predicted valuation) in each decade for concentrated industries. Concentrated
industries are those in the highest tercile of the tted sales based HHI (Herndahl index) in each year. We present each three digit SIC industry's identifying information and the year
in which it's relative valuation peaked. Weighted market to book equity is the industry's value weighted average of rm market-to-book ratios. Average rm market values are
reported in millions. To compute relative valuation, we rst t the following model based on Pastor and Veronesi (2003) (i denotes a rm and t denotes a year):
log( M
B )i;t = a + bAGEi;t + cDDi;t + dLEVi;t + elog(SIZEi;t) + fV OLPi;t + gROEi;t
We t this model once for each industry in each year using rm observations from year t   10 to t   1. A rm's relative valuation is its log(M=B) in year t less the tted value using
characteristics from year t and the above model estimated using the previous ten years. CSTAT concentration is the sales weighted Herndahl index for each industry (based on
segment data when available) using COMPUSTAT data only. The tted concentration index is based on three digit SIC codes and is the inferred level of industry concentration from
three databases: Department of Commerce manufacturing HHI data, Bureau of Labor Statistics employee data, and Compustat sales data.
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5Table III: Summary statistics
Standard Number of
Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum Observations
Panel A: Entire Sample
Industry Relative Valuation -0.022 0.239 -1.27 1.53 104,024
Industry New Financing 0.021 0.041 -.408 .638 104,024
Industry Relative Investment -0.018 0.069 -.598 1.54 104,024
Firm Relative Valuation -0.000 0.466 -3.21 3.31 104,024
Firm New Financing 0.012 0.137 -.849 1.46 104,024
Firm Relative Investment -0.000 0.301 -2.25 5.24 104,024
Operating Cash Flow Change -.008 .116 -1.45 1.59 97,780
Abnormal Return 0.001 0.157 -1.192 9.24 1,077,793
Panel B: Competitive Industries
Industry Relative Valuation 0.016 0.199 -1.03 1.03 48,558
Industry New Financing 0.024 0.040 -0.188 0.586 48,558
Industry Relative Investment -0.027 0.072 -0.363 0.690 48,558
Firm Relative Valuation -0.001 0.506 -3.211 3.310 48,558
Firm New Financing 0.023 0.166 -0.849 1.462 48,558
Firm Relative Investment 0.000 0.357 -2.249 5.246 48,558
Operating Cash Flow Change -0.011 0.143 -1.447 1.591 45,119
Abnormal Return 0.002 0.176 -1.192 9.25 575,863
Panel C: Concentrated Industries
Industry Relative Valuation 0.023 0.199 -1.27 1.20 17,163
Industry New Financing 0.016 0.044 -0.41 0.64 17,163
Industry Relative Investment -0.006 0.066 -0.57 1.54 17,163
Firm Relative Valuation -0.002 0.427 -2.13 2.70 17,163
Firm New Financing 0.004 0.110 -0.727 1.37 17,163
Firm Relative Investment 0.000 0.235 -1.60 3.85 17,163
Operating Cash Flow Change -0.009 0.088 -1.03 1.17 16,192
Abnormal Return -0.000 0.130 -0.954 4.81 135,447
Explanation: The table displays summary statistics for the entire sample (Panel A), and for subgroupings based
on the level of ex-ante tted concentration (Panels B and C). The tted concentration index is based on three digit
SIC codes and is the inferred level of industry concentration from three databases: Department of Commerce
manufacturing HHI data, Bureau of Labor Statistics employee data, and Compustat sales data. Competitive and
concentrated industries are those in the lowest and highest tercile based on this index. To compute relative
valuation, we rst t the following model based on Pastor and Veronesi (2003) (i denotes a rm and t denotes a
year):
log( M
B )i;t = a + bAGEi;t + cDDi;t + dLEVi;t + elog(SIZEi;t) + fV OLPi;t + gROEi;t
We t this model once for each industry in each year using rm observations from year t   10 to t   1. A rm's
relative valuation is its log(M=B) in year t less the tted value using characteristics from year t and the above
model estimated using the previous ten years. A rm's relative industry investment is computed in an analogous
fashion, except we also include the rm's lagged Tobin's Q as an independent variable. A rm's new nance is the
sum of its net debt and equity issuing activity, divided by its assets. For all three quantities, industry variables are
the average of the given quantity for all rms in a SIC-3 industry in year t, and rm variables are set equal to raw
quantities less the industry component. Operating cash ow is dened as operating income (COMPUSTAT annual
item 13) divided by assets (COMPUSTAT annual item 6). A rm's abnormal return is its raw monthly return
minus the monthly return of a portfolio matched on the basis of NYSE/AMEX breakpoints of size,
industry-adjusted book to market, and past year returns as in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997).
36Table IV: Regressions predicting Firm-level Operating Cash Flow Changes
All All
Industries Industries
Variable 1 Year 2 Years
Panel A: Sample-wide results
Industry Relative Valuation 0.0010 (0.140) {0.0269 ({3.130)a
Firm Relative Valuation 0.0034 (2.480)b {0.0065 ({3.750)a
Industry Relative Investment {0.0394 ({2.900)a {0.0464 ({2.070)b
Firm Relative Investment {0.0027 ({1.070) {0.0045 ({1.340)
Industry New Finance {0.0673 ({3.210)a {0.0357 ({1.390)
Firm New Finance {0.0287 ({2.670)a 0.0126 (1.030)
Change in EBITDA 0.0012 (0.340) {0.0081 ({1.920)c
Change in CAPX {0.0067 ({2.320)b 0.0009 (0.290)
Observations 83,974 75,653
Panel B: Competitive Industries
Industry Relative Valuation {0.0048 ({0.430) {0.0509 ({3.720)a;d
Firm Relative Valuation 0.0057 (2.790)a;e {0.0038 ({1.420)d
Industry Relative Investment {0.0620 ({2.740)a {0.0514 ({1.480)
Firm Relative Investment {0.0074 ({2.320)b;d {0.0108 ({2.550)b;e
Industry New Finance {0.0405 ({1.180) 0.0183 (0.430)
Firm New Finance {0.0352 ({2.560)b 0.0130 (0.830)
Change in EBITDA 0.0027 (0.440) {0.0111 ({1.400)
Change in CAPX {0.0093 ({1.780)c 0.0057 (0.980)
Observations 44,841 39,624
Panel C: Concentrated Industries
Industry Relative Valuation 0.0123 (2.590)a {0.0023 ({0.370)d
Firm Relative Valuation 0.0003 (0.160)e {0.0112 ({4.320)a;d
Industry Relative Investment {0.0122 ({0.860) {0.0365 ({1.870)c
Firm Relative Investment 0.0103 (1.720)c;d 0.0116 (1.580)e
Industry New Finance {0.0418 ({1.530) {0.0326 ({0.870)
Firm New Finance {0.0079 ({0.510) 0.0202 (1.090)
Change in EBITDA 0.0023 (0.680) {0.0031 ({0.620)
Change in CAPX {0.0054 ({1.650)c {0.0004 ({0.090)
Observations 16,169 14,867
Panel D: Industries with Declining Concentration
Industry Relative Valuation {0.0236 ({2.850)a;d {0.0534 ({6.060)a;d
Firm Relative Valuation 0.0045 (2.310)b {0.0066 ({2.590)a
Industry Relative Investment {0.0596 ({3.180)a;e {0.0635 ({2.060)b;f
Firm Relative Investment {0.0032 ({0.770) {0.0004 ({0.070)
Industry New Finance {0.0852 ({3.120)a;f {0.0181 ({0.530)
Firm New Finance {0.0299 ({1.700)c 0.0200 (1.080)
Change in EBITDA 0.0049 (1.280) {0.0038 ({0.900)
Change in CAPX {0.0086 ({2.260)b {0.0026 ({0.650)
Observations 36,601 31,328
Explanation: We report regression coecients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for panel data regressions.
t-statistics are adjusted for clustering over time and industry, and are corrected for heteroskedasticity. One
observation is one rm in one year, and the dependent variable is the rm's change in operating cash ow
(operating income / assets) from year t to year t+1. To compute relative valuation, we rst t the following model
based on Pastor and Veronesi (2003) (i denotes a rm and t denotes a year):
log( M
B )i;t = a + bAGEi;t + cDDi;t + dLEVi;t + elog(SIZEi;t) + fV OLPi;t + gROEi;t
We t this model once for each industry in each year using rm observations from year t   10 to t   1. A rm's
relative valuation is its log(M=B) in year t less the tted value using characteristics from year t and the above
model estimated using the previous ten years. A rm's relative industry investment is computed in an analogous
fashion, except we also include the rm's lagged Tobin's Q as an independent variable. A rm's new nance is the
sum of its net debt and equity issuing activity, divided by its assets. For all three quantities, industry variables are
the average of the given quantity for all rms in a SIC-3 industry in year t, and rm variables are set equal to raw
quantities less the industry component. Competitive and concentrated industries are those in the lowest and
highest tercile based on industry concentration (HHI). Change in EBITDA and CAPX are the past year changes in
earnings before interest and taxes plus depreciation and capital expenditures, winsorized at the 1/99% level. * a, b,
and c denote signicant dierences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. d, e, and f denote
signicant dierences from opposing tercile (competitive versus concentrated industries in Panels B, C, and
decreasing versus increasing concentration in Panel D) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.




Variable 1 Year 2 Years
Panel A: High Growth Industries
Industry Relative Valuation {0.0214 ({1.930)c {0.0568 ({4.250)a
Firm Relative Valuation 0.0054 (2.320)b {0.0032 ({1.100)
Industry Relative Investment {0.0590 ({2.670)a {0.0622 ({1.820)c
Firm Relative Investment {0.0073 ({1.870)c {0.0132 ({2.660)a
Industry New Finance {0.0972 ({2.620)a {0.0341 ({0.740)
Firm New Finance {0.0279 ({1.800)c 0.0185 (1.060)
Change in EBITDA 0.0080 (1.190) {0.0097 ({1.320)
Change in CAPX {0.0122 ({1.930)c {0.0003 ({0.040)
Observations 33,217 30,939
Panel B: Competitive High Growth Industries
Industry Relative Valuation {0.0456 ({2.450)b;d {0.1124 ({4.820)a;d
Firm Relative Valuation 0.0084 (2.660)a;e 0.0001 (0.040)d
Industry Relative Investment {0.1023 ({3.030)a {0.0924 ({1.950)c
Firm Relative Investment {0.0126 ({2.620)a {0.0215 ({3.510)a;f
Industry New Finance {0.0854 ({1.270) 0.0193 (0.240)
Firm New Finance {0.0318 ({1.730)c 0.0175 (0.840)
Change in EBITDA 0.0128 (1.250) {0.0136 ({1.180)
Change in CAPX {0.0156 ({1.550) {0.0014 ({0.120)
Observations 19,888 18,372
Panel C: Concentrated High Growth Industries
Industry Relative Valuation 0.0114 (1.310)d 0.0001 (0.010)d
Firm Relative Valuation 0.0005 (0.130)e {0.0164 ({3.370)a;d
Industry Relative Investment {0.0101 ({0.430) {0.0262 ({0.780)
Firm Relative Investment 0.0035 (0.360) 0.0070 (0.620)f
Industry New Finance {0.0905 ({1.490) {0.0790 ({0.980)
Firm New Finance 0.0287 (1.190) 0.0443 (1.630)
Change in EBITDA 0.0111 (1.540) 0.0064 (0.770)
Change in CAPX {0.0102 ({1.370) {0.0001 ({0.010)
Observations 4,968 4,683
Panel D: High Growth Industries with Declining Concentration
Industry Relative Valuation {0.0457 ({3.360)a {0.0716 ({5.260)a;f
Firm Relative Valuation 0.0052 (1.740)c {0.0044 ({1.100)
Industry Relative Investment {0.0632 ({2.320)b {0.0706 ({1.820)c
Firm Relative Investment {0.0080 ({1.310) {0.0082 ({1.260)
Industry New Finance {0.1325 ({3.150)a;e {0.0546 ({1.030)e
Firm New Finance {0.0299 ({1.160) 0.0232 (0.950)
Change in EBITDA 0.0104 (1.420) {0.0017 ({0.220)
Change in CAPX {0.0133 ({1.690)c {0.0045 ({0.560)
Observations 16,348 15,138
Explanation: We report regression coecients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for panel data regressions.
t-statistics are adjusted for clustering over time and industry, and are corrected for heteroskedasticity. One
observation is one rm in one year, and the dependent variable is the rm's change in operating cash ow
(operating income / assets) from year t to year t+1. We restrict the sample to rms in high growth industries,
which are those in the lowest tercile based on industry-average book to market ratios (which are rst winsorized at
the 1/99% level prior to taking industry averages). To compute relative valuation, we rst t the following model
based on Pastor and Veronesi (2003) (i denotes a rm and t denotes a year):
log( M
B )i;t = a + bAGEi;t + cDDi;t + dLEVi;t + elog(SIZEi;t) + fV OLPi;t + gROEi;t
We t this model once for each industry in each year using rm observations from year t   10 to t   1. A rm's
relative valuation is its log(M=B) in year t less the tted value using characteristics from year t and the above
model estimated using the previous ten years. A rm's relative industry investment is computed in an analogous
fashion, except we also include the rm's lagged Tobin's Q as an independent variable. A rm's new nance is the
sum of its net debt and equity issuing activity, divided by its assets. For all three quantities, industry variables are
the average of the given quantity for all rms in a SIC-3 industry in year t, and rm variables are set equal to raw
quantities less the industry component. Competitive and concentrated industries are those in the lowest and
highest tercile based on industry concentration (HHI). Change in EBITDA and CAPX are the past year changes in
earnings before interest and taxes plus depreciation and capital expenditures, winsorized at the 1/99% level. * a, b,
and c denote signicant dierences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. d, e, and f denote
signicant dierences from opposing tercile (competitive versus concentrated industries in Panels B, C, and
decreasing versus increasing concentration in Panel D) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
38Table VI: Regressions predicting analyst forecast optimism
All Competitive All Concentrated
Competitive Growth Concentrated Growth
Variable Industries Industries Industries Industries
Panel A: Analyst Forecast Optimism
Industry Relative Valuation {0.0070 ({0.990) 0.0330 (2.850)a {0.0051 ({0.510) 0.0154 (0.970)
Firm Relative Valuation {0.0006 ({0.290)f 0.0019 (0.700) 0.0082 (1.730)c;f 0.0009 (0.110)
Industry Relative Investment {0.0106 ({0.700) {0.0099 ({0.530) 0.0159 (0.590) 0.0016 (0.050)
Firm Relative Investment 0.0059 (2.640)a 0.0046 (1.450) 0.0098 (0.930) {0.0059 ({0.410)
Industry New Finance 0.0149 (0.610) 0.0473 (1.270) 0.0558 (1.680)c 0.1025 (1.940)c
Firm New Finance 0.0098 (1.950)c;e 0.0098 (1.650)c 0.0515 (2.670)a;e 0.0394 (1.060)
Log M/B Ratio 0.0015 (0.940)f 0.0019 (0.790) 0.0081 (2.620)a;f 0.0068 (1.170)
Log Market Value {0.0062 ({14.000)a {0.0059 ({9.780)a;f {0.0057 ({7.790)a {0.0026 ({1.430)f
Lagged Forecast Error 0.2674 (13.330)a;e 0.2835 (8.950)a;e 0.3713 (8.460)a;e 0.5116 (5.010)a;e
Lagged Forecast Error N/A {0.0008 ({0.340) 0.0027 (0.760) 0.0039 (0.580) {0.0044 ({0.310)
Observations 23,945 9,548 4,129 813
Explanation: Regressions examine the eect of relative rm- and industry-level valuation, investment and new nance on analyst forecast optimism. We report regression coecients
and t-statistics (in parentheses) for panel data regression models. t-statistics are adjusted for clustering over time and industry, and corrected for heteroskedasticity. One observation is
one rm in one year, and the dependent variable is the analyst forecast optimism. Analyst forecast optimism is dened as the analyst estimate of one year EPS minus the actual
outcome of EPS, scaled by price at the time of the estimate (all measures of EPS are adjusted for splits). To compute relative valuation, we rst t the following model based on
Pastor and Veronesi (2003) (i denotes a rm and t denotes a year):
log( M
B )i;t = a + bAGEi;t + cDDi;t + dLEVi;t + elog(SIZEi;t) + fV OLPi;t + gROEi;t
We t this model once for each industry in each year using rm observations from year t   10 to t   1. A rm's relative valuation is its log(M=B) in year t less the tted value using
characteristics from year t and the above model estimated using the previous ten years. A rm's relative industry investment is computed in an analogous fashion, except we also
include the rm's lagged Tobin's Q as an independent variable. A rm's new nance is the sum of its net debt and equity issuing activity, divided by its assets. For all three quantities,
industry variables are the average of the given quantity for all rms in a SIC-3 industry in year t, and rm variables are set equal to raw quantities less the industry component.
Competitive and concentrated industries are those in the lowest and highest tercile based on industry concentration (HHI). Growth industries are those in the lowest tercile based on
industry-average book to market ratios (which are rst winsorized at the 1/99% level prior to taking industry averages). * a, b, and c denote signicant dierences from zero at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. d, e, and f denote signicant dierences from opposing tercile (competitive versus concentrated industries) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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9Table VII: Regressions predicting monthly rm-level stock returns
Growth High Value High Mkt. Risk
All Industries Industries Industries
Variable Industries Only Only Only
Panel A: All Firms
Industry Relative Valuation {0.003 ({1.28) {0.013 ({3.58)a {0.015 ({3.10)a {0.011 ({3.17)a
Firm Relative Valuation {0.002 ({5.59)a {0.002 ({3.68)a {0.001 ({1.92)c {0.002 ({3.60)a
Industry Relative Investment {0.021 ({3.52)a {0.016 ({2.07)b {0.021 ({1.86)c {0.026 ({3.16)a
Firm Relative Investment {0.003 ({3.93)a {0.003 ({2.66)a {0.003 ({2.04)b {0.003 ({3.20)a
Industry New Finance {0.030 ({4.13)a {0.034 ({2.96)a {0.034 ({3.15)a {0.053 ({3.85)a
Firm New Finance {0.018 ({6.95)a {0.014 ({4.15)a {0.021 ({5.09)a {0.018 ({5.27)a
Observations 1,058,751 390,550 324,813 423,461
Panel B: Competitive Industries Only
Industry Relative Valuation {0.004 ({1.01) {0.020 ({3.76)a;d {0.029 ({3.90)a;d {0.018 ({3.51)a;d
Firm Relative Valuation {0.002 ({4.55)a {0.003 ({3.48)a;f {0.002 ({1.81)c {0.003 ({3.78)a;e
Industry Relative Investment {0.024 ({2.81)a {0.013 ({1.18) {0.019 ({1.32) {0.024 ({2.26)b
Firm Relative Investment {0.003 ({3.23)a {0.003 ({2.24)b;e {0.002 ({1.20) {0.003 ({2.35)b;f
Industry New Finance {0.046 ({3.86)a;f {0.067 ({3.77)a;d {0.054 ({3.09)a;f {0.087 ({4.33)a;d
Firm New Finance {0.017 ({5.64)a {0.014 ({3.66)a {0.021 ({4.55)a {0.017 ({4.46)a
Observations 575,863 249,874 181,107 267,305
Panel C: Concentrated Industries Only
Industry Relative Valuation 0.001 (0.43) 0.003 (0.68)d 0.010 (1.37)d 0.005 (1.09)d
Firm Relative Valuation {0.002 ({1.67)c 0.000 (0.27)f {0.001 ({0.34) 0.000 (0.35)e
Industry Relative Investment {0.014 ({1.65)c 0.007 (0.52) {0.017 ({1.22) {0.012 ({0.87)
Firm Relative Investment {0.004 ({2.00)b {0.008 ({3.40)a;e {0.005 ({1.41) {0.008 ({3.27)a;f
Industry New Finance {0.016 ({1.12)f 0.009 (0.49)d 0.001 (0.04)f {0.002 ({0.09)d
Firm New Finance {0.024 ({4.31)a {0.014 ({2.31)b {0.025 ({3.26)a {0.023 ({3.08)a
Observations 135,447 40,827 36,577 57,822
Panel D: Declining Concentration Industries Only)
Industry Relative Valuation {0.007 ({1.81)c {0.018 ({2.66)a {0.017 ({2.28)b;e {0.018 ({2.88)a
Firm Relative Valuation {0.003 ({4.02)a {0.003 ({3.00)a {0.002 ({2.38)b;f {0.002 ({2.25)b
Industry Relative Investment {0.019 ({1.90)c {0.008 ({0.62) {0.032 ({2.10)b;e {0.014 ({1.08)
Firm Relative Investment {0.002 ({1.45) {0.003 ({1.73)c {0.002 ({1.63) {0.003 ({2.10)b
Industry New Finance {0.032 ({2.94)a {0.043 ({2.53)b {0.058 ({3.52)a;f {0.050 ({2.60)a
Firm New Finance {0.015 ({3.31)a;f {0.011 ({1.90)c;f {0.021 ({4.06)a;e {0.013 ({2.20)b;e
Observations 367,279 169,804 131,061 172,857
Explanation: We report regression coecients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for panel data regressions. t-statistics are from standard errors that are adjusted for clustering over
time and industry, and are corrected for heteroskedasticity. One observation is one rm in one month, and the dependent variable is the rm's monthly abnormal stock return: equal to
a rm's raw monthly return less that of a portfolio matched on the basis of NYSE/AMEX breakpoints of size, industry-adjusted book to market, and past year returns as in Daniel,
Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). For monthly abnormal return observations between July of year t+1 and June of year t+2, independent variables are constructed using
accounting data with scal years ending in year t. To compute relative valuation, we rst t the following model based on Pastor and Veronesi (2003) (i denotes a rm and t denotes a
year): log( M
B )i;t = a + bAGEi;t + cDDi;t + dLEVi;t + elog(SIZEi;t) + fV OLPi;t + gROEi;t
We t this model once for each industry in each year using rm observations from year t   10 to t   1. A rm's relative valuation is its log(M=B) in year t less the tted value using
characteristics from year t and the above model estimated using the previous ten years. A rm's relative industry investment is computed in an analogous fashion, except we also
include the rm's lagged Tobin's Q as an independent variable. A rm's new nance is the sum of its net debt and equity issuing activity, divided by its assets. For all three quantities,
industry variables are the average of the given quantity for all rms in a SIC-3 industry in year t, and rm variables are set equal to raw quantities less the industry component.
Competitive and concentrated industries are those in the lowest and highest tercile based on industry concentration (HHI). The growth, high valuation, and high market risk industry
groupings are based on terciles constructed from industry-average book to market ratios, relative industry valuation, and the industry's average market beta in the past year. * a, b,
and c denote signicant dierences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. d, e, and f denote signicant dierences from opposing tercile (competitive versus
concentrated industries in Panels B, C, and decreasing versus increasing concentration in Panel D) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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0Table VIII: Regressions predicting rm R-squared (comovement with market and industry)
All Competitive Competitive All Concentrated Concentrated
Competitive Growth High Val. Concentrated Growth High Val.
Variable Industries Industries Industries Industries Industries Industries
Panel A: R-squared in Market+Industry Return Model
Industry Relative Valuation 0.0858 (6.430)a;d 0.1185 (4.560)a;d 0.1958 (4.680)a;d 0.0088 (0.670)d 0.0044 (0.230)d 0.0325 (1.430)d
Firm Relative Valuation 0.0312 (14.850)a;e 0.0384 (10.330)a;d 0.0381 (9.060)a 0.0200 (5.650)a;e 0.0077 (1.140)d 0.0282 (3.970)a
Industry Relative Investment 0.0244 (0.980) 0.0073 (0.240) 0.0680 (1.450) {0.0123 ({0.510) {0.0105 ({0.200) {0.0166 ({0.320)
Firm Relative Investment {0.0067 ({4.480)a {0.0066 ({2.820)a {0.0042 ({1.720)c {0.0060 ({1.340) {0.0157 ({2.720)a {0.0141 ({1.700)c
Industry New Finance 0.0889 (2.510)b;f {0.0123 ({0.220) 0.0627 (0.810) {0.0319 ({0.750)f {0.0322 ({0.460) {0.0468 ({0.690)
Firm New Finance {0.0200 ({3.690)a;d {0.0325 ({5.270)a;e {0.0104 ({1.400) 0.0166 (1.430)d 0.0192 (0.880)e 0.0128 (0.520)
Observations 52,054 21,290 16,209 11,885 3,201 3,201
Explanation: Regressions examine the eect of relative rm- and industry-level valuation, investment and new nance on rm comovement with the market and with its industry.
The dependent variable is the R-squared of a regression of each rm's daily stock returns in the given calendar year on the value weighted market index and the rm's value weighted
three-digit SIC industry excluding the rm itself. We report regression coecients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for panel data regression models. t-statistics are from standard
errors that are adjusted for clustering over time and industry, and corrected for heteroskedasticity. One observation is one rm in one year. To compute relative valuation, we rst t
the following model based on Pastor and Veronesi (2003) (i denotes a rm and t denotes a year):
log( M
B )i;t = a + bAGEi;t + cDDi;t + dLEVi;t + elog(SIZEi;t) + fV OLPi;t + gROEi;t
We t this model once for each industry in each year using rm observations from year t   10 to t   1. A rm's relative valuation is its log(M=B) in year t less the tted value using
characteristics from year t and the above model estimated using the previous ten years. A rm's relative industry investment is computed in an analogous fashion, except we also
include the rm's lagged Tobin's Q as an independent variable. A rm's new nance is the sum of its net debt and equity issuing activity, divided by its assets. For all three quantities,
industry variables are the average of the given quantity for all rms in a SIC-3 industry in year t, and rm variables are set equal to raw quantities less the industry component.
Competitive and concentrated industries are those in the lowest and highest tercile based on industry concentration (HHI). Growth industries are those in the lowest tercile based on
industry-average book to market ratios (which are rst winsorized at the 1/99% level prior to taking industry averages). * a, b, and c denote signicant dierences from zero at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. d, e, and f denote signicant dierences from opposing tercile (competitive versus concentrated industries) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
4
1Table IX: Regressions predicting annual changes in risk
Competitive Competitive Competitive
All Growth High Value High Mkt. Risk
Competitive Industries Industries Industries
Variable Industries Only Only Only
Panel A: Changes in Market Beta
Industry Relative Valuation 0.3216 (5.060)a;d 0.2984 (2.800)a 0.5247 (2.550)b 0.2911 (2.840)a;f
Firm Relative Valuation 0.0785 (7.610)a;f 0.0993 (6.320)a 0.1094 (6.580)a;f 0.1111 (7.390)a
Industry Relative Investment {0.5388 ({4.600)a;d {0.3769 ({2.550)b {0.4075 ({2.070)b {0.4592 ({3.070)a
Firm Relative Investment {0.0350 ({3.010)a {0.0427 ({2.790)a {0.0280 ({1.660)c {0.0317 ({2.050)b
Industry New Finance 0.2747 (1.780)c {0.0496 ({0.230) 0.2268 (0.860) {0.3059 ({1.270)
Firm New Finance 0.2692 (7.330)a 0.2278 (5.130)a 0.3277 (6.550)a 0.2129 (4.500)a
Lagged Market Beta {0.5930 ({55.280)a {0.5930 ({39.680)a {0.5714 ({34.440)a {0.5870 ({40.940)a
Observations 48,878 21,594 15,461 23,000
Panel B: Changes in Idiosyncratic Risk
Industry Relative Valuation {0.0052 ({5.240)a {0.0038 ({2.580)a {0.0005 ({0.270) {0.0052 ({3.470)a
Firm Relative Valuation {0.0016 ({5.360)a {0.0020 ({4.510)a;e {0.0016 ({4.400)a {0.0019 ({4.630)a
Industry Relative Investment 0.0015 (0.550) 0.0028 (0.740) 0.0063 (1.800)c 0.0016 (0.400)
Firm Relative Investment 0.0005 (1.460) 0.0007 (1.520) 0.0009 (1.550) 0.0008 (1.750)c
Industry New Finance 0.0118 (3.270)a 0.0109 (1.860)c 0.0182 (3.100)a;f 0.0106 (1.750)c
Firm New Finance 0.0086 (8.560)a 0.0088 (7.130)a 0.0076 (6.620)a 0.0092 (7.600)a
Lagged Idio. Risk {0.1944 ({9.550)a {0.2319 ({6.870)a {0.2388 ({7.740)a {0.2524 ({7.910)a
Observations 48,878 21,594 15,461 23,000
Explanation: Regressions examine the eect of relative rm- and industry-level valuation, investment and new nancing on yearly changes in risk. We report regression coecients
t-statistics (in parentheses) for panel data regressions. t-statistics are from standard errors that are adjusted for clustering over time and industry, and are corrected for
heteroskedasticity. Results in all three panels of this table are restricted to various industry groupings as noted in the column headers. One observation is one rm in one year. For
independent variables collected using data from calendar year t, the dependent variable is the change in risk (ex-post risk minus ex-ante risk). Ex-ante risk is measured using one year
of daily rm level data from July of year t to June of year t+1, and ex-post risk is measured using one year of daily data from July of year t+1 to June of year t+2. Ex-ante and
ex-post risk levels are both estimated using the following model (d denotes one trading day in year y and i denotes a rm):
ri;y;d = i;y + i;y;1MKTd + i;y;2HMLd + i;y;3SMBd + i;y;4UMDd + i;y;d
The dependent variable in Panel A is based on the market beta (i;y;1), and is the ex-post exposure less the ex-ante exposure. Idiosyncratic risk in Panel B is the ex-post standard
deviation of the residuals from the above model less the ex-ante standard deviation. The explanatory variables are discussed in Table III. We only examine market betas and
idiosyncratic risk because the theoretical predictions we examine only relate to these items. * a, b, and c denote signicant dierences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. d, e, and f denote signicant dierences from opposing tercile (competitive versus concentrated industries at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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2Table X: Regressions predicting change-in-risk adjusted monthly rm-level stock returns
Growth High Value High Mkt. Risk
All Industries Industries Industries
Variable Industries Only Only Only
Panel A: All Firms
Industry Relative Valuation 0.004 (2.00)b {0.002 ({0.54) {0.006 ({1.34) 0.000 ({0.08)
Firm Relative Valuation {0.002 ({4.50)a {0.002 ({3.37)a {0.001 ({1.47) {0.002 ({2.74)a
Industry Relative Investment {0.018 ({3.17)a {0.010 ({1.45) {0.024 ({2.10)b {0.027 ({3.32)a
Firm Relative Investment {0.003 ({3.88)a {0.003 ({3.03)a {0.003 ({2.21)b {0.003 ({3.52)a
Industry New Finance {0.023 ({3.48)a {0.026 ({2.50)b {0.021 ({2.10)b {0.036 ({2.97)a
Firm New Finance {0.018 ({6.88)a {0.016 ({4.41)a {0.021 ({4.96)a {0.020 ({5.41)a
Observations 1,005,385 398,424 307,821 403,585
Panel B: Competitive Industries Only
Industry Relative Valuation {0.001 ({0.40) {0.015 ({2.77)a;d {0.027 ({3.71)a;d {0.010 ({1.86)c
Firm Relative Valuation {0.003 ({5.49)a {0.003 ({4.13)a;f {0.002 ({2.34)b {0.003 ({4.06)a;f
Industry Relative Investment {0.023 ({2.74)a {0.012 ({1.09)f {0.022 ({1.50) {0.031 ({2.69)a
Firm Relative Investment {0.003 ({3.31)a {0.003 ({2.56)b;f {0.002 ({1.34) {0.003 ({2.55)b
Industry New Finance {0.041 ({3.57)a {0.054 ({3.19)a;e {0.047 ({2.80)a;f {0.067 ({3.72)a;e
Firm New Finance {0.019 ({5.68)a {0.016 ({3.86)a {0.023 ({4.72)a {0.020 ({4.74)a
Observations 536,315 231,069 167,347 249,803
Explanation: Regressions examine the eect of relative rm- and industry-level valuation, investment and new nance on changes-in-risk-adjusted rm-level monthly abnormal stock
returns. We report regression coecients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for panel data regressions. t-statistics are from standard errors that are adjusted for clustering over time and
industry, and are corrected for heteroskedasticity. One observation is one rm in one month, and the dependent variable is the rm's changes-in-risk-adjusted monthly abnormal
return. To compute this variable, we start with the standard abnormal return, which is a rm's raw monthly return minus the monthly return of a portfolio matched on the basis of
NYSE/AMEX breakpoints of size, industry-adjusted book to market, and past year returns as in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). To adjust for changes in risk, we use
a two-step procedure. Frist, we regress our monthly rm-level style matched abnormal returns on changes in the four risk factors (MKT, HML, SMB, UMD) and idiosyncratic risk
from year t to year t+2. We also include controls for the year t risk levels given that our previous section's results show that risk exposures are mean reverting. These regressions are
non-predictive, as we examine changes in risk across the same period in which returns are measured. Second, we take the residuals of this rst stage regression and regress them on our
usual set of relative valuation, relative investment, and relative nancing variables. * a, b, and c denote signicant dierences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. d,
e, and f denote signicant dierences from opposing tercile (competitive versus concentrated industries) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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3Table XI: Average quintile portfolio abnormal returns
Firm Level Returns Industry Level Returns
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Panel A: Sample-wide results
Industry Relative Valuation 0.467 2.245 2.161 1.262 {2.228 {0.274 {1.041 {0.897 {0.135 {1.339
Firm Relative Valuation 3.164 1.386 0.578 0.439 {0.728
Industry Relative Investment 3.287 1.193 0.738 1.238 {2.627 {0.093 {0.421 {0.630 {0.737 {1.812
Firm Relative Investment 2.562 1.880 1.398 0.125 {1.152
Industry New Finance 0.873 0.761 3.610 0.554 {2.526 {1.123 {0.308 0.239 {0.517 {1.984
Firm New Finance 3.305 2.903 2.635 0.439 {4.449
Panel B: Competitive Industries
Industry Relative Valuation 0.079 4.730 4.064 2.586 {4.293 {1.001 {0.359 {0.671 0.187 {2.240
Firm Relative Valuation 4.259 2.887 1.143 0.995 {0.277
Industry Relative Investment 4.827 1.751 1.686 2.310 {4.331 {0.834 0.734 {0.649 {0.384 {2.857
Firm Relative Investment 3.128 2.692 2.741 0.743 {0.306
Industry New Finance 1.134 1.438 6.122 1.349 {3.400 {0.252 0.620 {0.205 {0.306 {3.173
Firm New Finance 3.661 4.225 4.450 1.336 {4.293
Panel C: Competitive Growth Industries
Industry Relative Valuation 6.493 6.809 3.012 {2.073 {8.581 0.154 1.255 {0.055 {4.158 {3.495
Firm Relative Valuation 4.595 3.707 2.320 1.286 {1.142
Industry Relative Investment 6.679 {1.926 6.188 {0.366 {1.076 {1.317 {1.321 1.374 {1.682 {3.099
Firm Relative Investment 3.739 1.703 3.427 1.001 0.736
Industry New Finance 2.455 0.793 7.590 2.048 {8.690 {1.129 {0.545 0.484 0.644 {5.514
Firm New Finance 4.351 3.636 5.051 1.862 {3.783
Explanation: The table presents average risk-adjusted stock returns for various portfolios based on quintiles of key boom and bust variables noted in the rst column. Reported
abnormal returns are monthly returns (multiplied by twelve for convenience) reported as percentages. Results are based on the entire sample (1972 to 2004), and we report both
rm-level (one observation is one rm) and industry level (one observation is one industry) average returns. Within each portfolio, one observation is one rm in one month. A rm's
abnormal return is its raw monthly return minus the monthly return of a portfolio matched on the basis of NYSE/AMEX breakpoints of size, industry-adjusted book to market, and
past year returns as in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). For monthly abnormal return observations between July of year t+1 and June of year t+2, portfolio
assignments are constructed using accounting data with scal years ending in year t. We form quintile portfolios based on industry averages of observed rm-specic relative valuation,
relative investment, and new nancing. Panel A includes all industries, Panel B includes competitive industries only (lowest tted HHI tercile), Panel C includes competitive growth
industries only (lowest tted HHI tercile and lowest B/M ratio tercile).
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